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AGDA-A (M) (16 Apr 71) FOR OT-UT-784119

5 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report (6) Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Airborne Division, ~~ending 31 October 1970~~ (U)

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*Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 70.*

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Verne L. Bowers*  
**VERNE L. BOWERS**  
 Major General, USA  
 The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

## 1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. Operations. The reporting period was marked by continuing close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the Thua Thien Province and District Officials. This close coordination and cooperation was exploited in the conduct of operations designed to assist GVN forces in assuming full responsibility for all aspects of combat, pacification and development (Vietnamization).

(1) Operation TEXAS STAR, a division wide operation that commenced on 1 April 1970, continued through the reporting until termination on 5 September 1970.

(a) The division continued to conduct extensive airmobile operations in the canopied mountains of the division AO, employing the 1st and 3d Bdes, in coordination with the 1st, 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN), and division reconnaissance assets to maintain a protective shield beyond the periphery of the populated lowlands, locate and destroy enemy units, base camps and cache sites, and interdict enemy movement into the lowlands. These operations provided the necessary secure environment in which the 2d Bde, in coordination with the 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN) was able to assist GVN officials of Thua Thien Province and Districts, in pursuing national objectives related to GVN political stability and socio-economic development.

(b) In early August, Operation CHISACO PEAK/LAM SON 363 continued in the FS/OBs MAUREEN, GOODMAN and AIRBORNE area. Elements of the 1st Bde, in operational coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN) had assaulted into the area on 25 July, followed on 30 July by two battalions of the 3d Regt (ARVN). This operation was designed to locate and destroy enemy cache sites, logistical facilities, and interdict routes of resupply and communication in the mountainous area northeast of the A SHAU VALLEY. This area was believed to contain the base areas of the 803d and 29th NVA Regiments. The operation was terminated on 12 August with moderate success. There were 97 enemy killed and 32 enemy weapons captured, compared to three ARVN KIA and no US KIA. However, no major cache sites and logistical facilities were discovered.

(c) Also in early August, intelligence information and increased enemy activity evidenced an enemy build-up of forces in the FS/OB O'REILLY area. Intelligence gained from a Hoi Chanh, who rallied on 12 August, indicated that the 6th NVA Regt was preparing for major assaults designed

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1

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

to force ARVN units to evacuate O'REILLY during the month of August. In response to this intelligence, the 1st Regt (ARVN) reinforced elements securing FS/OB O'REILLY and deployed three battalions to conduct search and attack operations in the O'REILLY area. The 3d Bde, in coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN) commenced operations northwest of FS/OB O'REILLY in the BARNETT and JEROME areas. Combined operations continued in the O'REILLY, BARNETT and JEROME areas throughout the month of August and were successful in locating and inflicting heavy casualties on enemy units in the area.

(d) During the period 26 August to 5 September, the division began repositioning and realigning units in preparation for the implementation of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70. This realignment included a change in responsibility for support of pacification, development and mobile training teams in the populated lowlands of the division AO. The 3d Bde assumed responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in the four districts of Thua Thien Province north of the Perfume River: PHONG DIEN, QUANG DIEN, HUONG DIEN and HUONG TRA Districts. The 2d Bde retained responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in MAJ HOA, PHU THU, HUONG THUY, VINH LOC, PHU LOC and PHU VANG Districts.

(e) Enemy losses inflicted by the division during Operation TEXAS STAR were:

Killed in Action (body count)	2053
Prisoners of War	38
Ralliers	14
Individual Weapons Captured	420
Crew Served Weapons Captured	121

Total division casualties during the operation were:

Killed in Action	349
Died of Wounds	37
Wounded in Action	1978
Missing in Action	7

(2) The division implemented Operation Order 13-70, JEFFERSON GLEN/



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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

MONSOON PLAN 70 on 251000 September 1970. As this plan was being developed, the analysis of the enemy situation indicated the enemy's probable courses of action would be to maintain pressure on US, ARVN and territorial forces, while continuing to rebuild the Viet Cong infrastructure. Offensive activity was expected to be characterized by attacks by fire and limited ground and sapper attacks directed against Allied maneuver units, fire support bases, and lightly defended outposts in the coastal lowlands. In the longer time period it was anticipated that the enemy would attempt to improve and extend existing base areas and lines of communication eastward until he had established forward staging areas which would sustain a general military offensive and/or the redeployment of US Forces from RVN presented an opportunity to launch a major attack. JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 was designed to counter these probable enemy courses of action and to exploit the lessons learned during the 1969 northeast monsoon season.

## (a) Task Organization

<u>1st Brigade</u>	<u>2d Brigade</u>	<u>3d Brigade</u>
1-327 Inf	2-327 Inf	3-187 Inf
1-501 Inf	1-502 Inf	1-506 Inf
2-502 Inf	2-501 Inf	2-506 Inf
2-320 Arty (105mm how) (DS)	3-506 Inf	2-319 Arty (105mm how) (DS)
A(-)/326 Engr (DS)	1-321 Arty (135 mm how) (DS)	B(-)/32 Engr (DS)
1st FSSE, DISCOM (DS)	C(-)/326 Engr (DS)	3d FSSE, DISCOM (DS)
Tm, 121 MI Co (-)	2d FSSE, DISCOM (DS)	Tm, 121 MI Co (DS)
1-225 RRC (DS)	Tm, 121 MI Co (-) (DS)	3-225 RRC (DS)
49 Inf Plt (Sct Dog)	2-265 RRC (DS)	49th Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
	Spt Tm 501 Sig (DS)	2 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det
	4 Tms, 4th PSYOP Det	
<u>2-17 Cav</u>	<u>101 Avn Gp</u>	<u>Div Troops</u>
Co L (Ranger) 75th Inf	113 Avn Co	326 Engr Bn

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

	101 Avn Bn (AH)	501 Sig Bn
<u>RTS COM</u>	158 Avn Bn (AH)	101 MP Co
426 S&A Bn	159 Avn Bn (ASH)	265 PRC
801 Maint Bn	478 Avn Co (-) (DS)	10th Qal Plt
326 Med Bn		20th Qal Det
5th Trans (Aft Maint & Sup- ply Bn)	<u>101 Abn Div Arty</u>	101 MI Co
	2-11 Arty	557 Inf Plt (Cbt Trackers)
	4-77 Arty (Aerial Arty)	4th PSOP Det (DS)
	A/377 Arty (Avn)	7th Plt, 29th CA Co (DS)

(b) The primary mission of JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 is to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of THUA THIEN Province, to locate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication and to assist GVN officials in meeting their pacification and development goals for 1970. The operation continues the concept of a complete integration of effort of all agencies within the division area of operation for the accomplishment of the inseparable tasks of improving territorial security, protecting the people against terrorism, improving the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF), developing local self management in administrative, economic, and financial affairs, developing a greater national unity, improving the life for war victims, establishing an information system to educate and motivate the people to participate in local development, and continuing to build towards prosperity for all.

(c) To accomplish this mission during the northeast monsoon season, division units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions. Repositioning facilitated resupply operations by road and greatly decreased the possibility of small units being isolated deep in the canopied mountains without the capability of being reinforced, as a result of extended periods of inclement weather. The 1st Bde was positioned southwest of HUE to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in their assigned AO. Elements of the Bde secured PS/OB BASTOGNE (ID 620095), BIRMINGHAM (ID 706102), and VERGHEL (ID 549034), prepared to alce VERGHEL.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ECS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

on order. The Bde continued to conduct operations in close coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bde was positioned in the lowlands, piedmont and eastern mountain regions to support the pacification and development program in close coordination and cooperation with the 54th Regt (ARVN). Elements of the Bde secured FS/OBs ARSENAL (YD 812082), BRICK (YC 835995), TOMAHAWK (ZD 118013), and LOS BANOS (AT 832999). The Bde maintained liaison with the six districts of THUA THIEN Province as stated above. The 3d Bde was positioned in the lowlands, piedmont and canopy regions south of CAMP EVANS to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close coordination with the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN). Elements of the Bde secured FS/OBs RAKHASAN (YD 489197) and JACK (YD 495287) and maintained liaison with the four northern districts of THUA THIEN Province.

(d) During the month of September, concentrated enemy activity continued in FS/OB O'REILLY area. It became apparent that the enemy remained determined to drive ARVN forces from the area by employing indirect fire attacks, followed by limited ground probes. These tactics resulted in light casualties to ARVN forces in the area. Combined search and attack operations by elements of the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN), supported by division assets, continued to locate and inflict moderate casualties on the enemy.

(e) On 26 September, elements of the 1st Bde, in coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN), air assaulted to conduct limited objective operations in the FS/OBs TENNESSEE and WHIP area. This operation was conducted in reaction to intelligence which indicated the 5th Regt, NMTTH base areas were located in the vicinity of TENNESSEE and WHIP. During this same time period, elements of the 2d Bde conducted operations deep in the division AO in the vicinity of the HOUNG HOUNG VALLEY to locate and destroy base areas of the 4th Regt, NMTTH. Persisting low clouds, high winds and heavy rains restricted these operations during the period 1 to 3 October. Both operations were terminated on 4 October with minimal success. Small amounts of enemy stores had been located and evacuated or destroyed, but no major base areas had been discovered and no significant enemy contact had been established.

(f) Following their operation in the TENNESSEE and WHIP area, the 1st Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN) launched a combined operation in the area north of FS/OB BASTOGNE in the vicinity of the traditional boundary of the 1st Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN). A build-up of intelligence during the last two weeks of October indicated the presence of elements of the 810th Bn, 5th NVA Regt in this area. Operations in the BASTOGNE area continued through the reporting period with sporadic contact, resulting in 53 NVA/VC KIA and 38 individual weapons captured.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(g) PS/OB O'REILLY was closed by the 1st Regt (ARVN) on 7 October. Operations in the vicinity of O'REILLY were highly successful, causing moderate to heavy NVA casualties. The massing of forces around the firebase during August and September had presented numerous targets which were vulnerable to allied fire support weapons systems. The decision to close PS/OB O'REILLY was based on expected difficulty in resupplying or reinforcing elements in the area during the northeast monsoon. The enemy had not forced the 1st Regt (ARVN) to withdraw from the firebase.

## (3) G3 Air Activities:

(a) During the reporting period, close air support sorties were flown in the division area of operation as follows:

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
FAC directed air strikes	975	757	161	1893
Combat Sky Spot	201	119	175	495
USAF Gunship (Shadow and Stinger)	13	12	0	25
USMC Flareship	1	4	0	5

## Ordinance Expended

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
HE (Tons)	2882.50	2007.50	1044.75	5934.75
Napalm (Tons)	192.00	116.75	6.50	315.25
20mm cannon (rds)	47,610	99,773	23,420	170,803

(b) The following ARC LIGHT strikes were employed in the division AO:

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
	75	68	11	154

(c) Bomb damage assessments of tactical air strikes and ARC LIGHT strikes during the reporting period revealed the following:

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
Enemy killed by air force	46	27	18	87

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Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Secondary fires	61	20	10	91
Secondary explosions	100	83	41	224
Road interdiction (craters)	164	139	29	332
Military structures destroyed	269	105	16	390
Vehicles destroyed/damaged	3	9	0	12
Bunkers destroyed	394	214	68	676
Bunkers damaged	64	23	13	100
Tunnels/caves/fighting positions destroyed or damaged	80	127	41	248
Ammo dumps destroyed	10	1	3	14
Comm cables/wires cut	2	1	0	3
122mm rockets destroyed	0	0	30 (boxes)	30
Landing zones cut (2 ship)	20	26	6	52
Rappel landing zones cut	10	5	1	26
Machine guns/unidentified guns/mortars destroyed	22	10	1	33
Bridges damaged/destroyed	0	2	0	2

(4) Enemy losses during the reporting period:

	<u>ETA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>INC</u>	<u>CSMC</u>
Aug	306	15	80	39
Sep	230	2	65	14
Oct	115	2	37	5
Totals	651	19	182	58

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFUE-65 (R2) (U)

(5) Friendly casualties during the reporting period:

UNIT	KIA	MIA	MIA	MED	MFI	TOTAL	
HHC/DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HHC/1 BDE	0	1	0	0	0	1	
HHC/2 BDE	0	0	0	0	0	0	
HHC/3 BDE	0	1	0	0	0	1	
3/187 INF	2	16	0	2	5	25	
1/327 INF	2	2	0	0	2	6	
2/327 INF	0	4	0	0	5	9	
1/501 INF	2	5	0	0	1	8	
2/501 INF	2	17	0	0	3	22	
1/502 INF	2	5	0	0	3	10	
2/502 INF	8	72	0	0	5	85	
1/506 INF	0	4	0	1	4	9	
2/506 INF	0	4	0	1	6	11	
3/506 INF	0	0	0	0	2	2	
DIV ARTY	4	2	0	0	7	13	
101 AVN CP	1	14	0	0	3	18	
SPT COMB	0	3	0	3	2	8	
2/17 CAV	4	19	0	1	4	28	
1/75 RANGERS	3	6	0	0	2	11	
326 ENGRS	0	3	0	2	1	6	
501 SIG	0	0	0	0	0	0	
101 MP	0	0	0	0	0	0	
TOTAL	30	178	0	8	10	55	273

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(6) Operations Narrative for period 1 August - 31 October. See Inclosure 1.

### b. Training:

(1) The current battalion refresher training program, initiated 12 May 1970, has continued with slight changes in rotation of battalions caused by operational commitments. The number of mandatory subjects and training hours has been reduced from 27 hours to 15-1/2 hours to allow battalion commanders more flexibility for instruction during refresher training.

(2) A sniper course of instruction has been established at the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School for the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). The intent of the program of instruction is to conduct intensive marksmanship training for selected personnel of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN). Students successfully completing the course will be highly skilled marksmen, capable of engaging the enemy at extended small arms ranges. Class 1-70 will commence on 8 November 1970. The training program will be of 14 days duration.

(3) The division began receiving infusion personnel from other commands for replacement training at SERTS on 8 September 1970. Initially, the program was of 19-1/2 hours duration. As the number of arriving personnel increased, it became necessary to reduce the instruction to 13 training hours, permitting a more rapid turnover at SERTS. The objective of the training is to provide instruction in those areas that are required to attain maximum degree of combat proficiency in airmobile operations.

(4) The division has reduced its GVN training program in the populated lowlands. The division discontinued employment of the dedicated battalion on 24 August 1970, and the number of MTIs deployed decreased from 22 to 2 during the quarter due to the arrival of newly formed Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT). The remaining 2 teams are located in Phu Thu and Nam Hoa Districts. These two teams train and conduct operations with separate RF companies. Presently there are no MATs programed to replace these teams. It is anticipated that these teams will remain active until they are no longer needed by the respective districts. During the last quarter, the following combined operations were conducted:

91 company-size operations

15 platoon-size operations

22 RF squad-size operations

11 PF platoon-size operations

These combined operations consisted primarily of night ambushes and daylight patrols. Reconnaissance in force, combat assaults, and Eagle Flight operations

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

were also conducted. Formal classes were taught by MTTs when GVN officials or local commanders requested instruction in specific subject areas. Elements of the division will continue to maintain liaison with each of the 10 rural districts in Thua Thien Province for the purpose of coordinating combined operations.

(5) Preparations for the northeast monsoon were initiated in mid-August, in order to place the division in the best possible posture for the rainy period. The need for wet weather training was emphasized to all battalions. It was recommended that battalions modify refresher training lesson plans in appropriate subject areas to integrate training on operational problems caused by the northeast monsoon. It was further recommended that battalions include in their refresher training river crossing techniques, construction of defensive positions, equipment maintenance, and field hygiene during the northeast monsoon.

(6) On 1 September 1970, the NETT/M203 team arrived at the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) to begin training the 801st Maintenance Battalion (Airmobile), and armorers and grenadiers within the division on the M203 grenade launchers. The weapon was received favorably by the division. On 23 October 1970, the NETT/M203 team returned to follow-up previous instruction. The team noted that in many cases the M203 barrel would not lock in position. This has been attributed to excess plastic on the breech end of the handgrip or to the barrel latch being a fraction too long. CPT Charles White, team chief, noted that this fault had been discovered in a few isolated cases during the initial instruction. He recommended, at that time, that the specifications and plans for the barrel handgrips and barrel latches be re-examined to determine where the problem exists.

### c. Chemical

(1) General. The division chemical section, with operational control of the 20th Chemical Detachment (CBRC) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (DS) continued the program of combat support.

(2) New Techniques. Employment of FMIS Slurry. FMIS Slurry has been used in several areas throughout the division AO. The slurry is an ultraviolet sensitive material of the Personnel Marking and Identification System which is used to mark and identify individuals trespassing in unauthorized areas within the division AO. Target areas are planned by division, brigade, ARVN and District Headquarters. The slurry is employed using the Agavenco sprayer mounted in a UH-1 helicopter. The target areas are known or suspected enemy routes of infiltration. These routes are restricted to civilian use and have low vegetation for helicopter spray operations. A line approximately 20 meters wide and 3,000 meters long is created by making several low-level passes perpendicular to the suspected direction of enemy movement. Approximately 700 gallons of FMIS Slurry have been employed to date. Ultraviolet lanterns are used to monitor civilians to detect traces of the FMIS slurry. Monitoring is conducted at entrances to base camp areas and during cordon and search operations. Over a 3 week period



## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

4,950 individuals have been monitored resulting in 39 persons being detained. Traces of the slurry were found on their shoes, feet, and clothing. Detainees were questioned by division IPW Teams and Vietnamese National Police. Though most personnel were released, several admitted trespassing into unauthorized areas and 12 individuals were identified as draft dodgers.

(3) Improvisation. Truck-mounted diesel defoliation rig. The use of authorized herbicides (Blue and White) is restricted to areas specifically approved by Province and MACV authorities. Requirements often arise to defoliate in areas where herbicides are not authorized. Therefore, in a continuing effort to exploit new ways to enhance support to ground unit commanders, a method was developed to burn vegetation with diesel. This is accomplished by use of a 75% diesel - 25% oil mixture dispersed from truck-mounted diesel containers using two hoses and a 100 GPM pump. Any type diesel containers, hoses, and pump that have compatible fittings will work. Three men are required to operate the rig - a truck driver, a pump operator, and a hose man. When the diesel has been dispersed in sufficient concentration and the truck removed to a safe area, the vegetation can be ignited by a portable flamethrower, trip flares, or smoke grenades. If burning cannot be accomplished because of mines, communication wires, or other equipment in the area, the diesel fuel is allowed to remain on the ground. The diesel, if left on the grass, will kill the vegetation in about seven days. In this case, a fire guard should watch the area for approximately five hours after spraying to prevent accidental ignition. After this time the diesel will have soaked into the ground and will be very difficult to ignite. The diesel defoliation operation is supervised by an officer or responsible noncommissioned officer. Fire extinguishers should be readily available. Using this method, defoliation was accomplished around five Vietnamese district headquarters, several fire support bases and base camp perimeters, and a critical bridge site.

(4) Expedient. Use of Persistent CS on enemy crops.

Due to a rapid increase in reported enemy crop locations within the division AO, an extensive crop destruction program was initiated during August using organic division assets. Lug-A-Jugs filled with herbicide agent BLUs were employed on small, widely scattered plots. Three crop locations were reported with numerous large cultivated fields which would require an extensive effort to destroy employing Lug-A-Jugs. To reduce the effort required to deny the crops to the enemy, a plan was devised and executed to drop bulk CS on the three large fields to restrict enemy harvesting efforts and to contaminate the crops with CS. Two CH-47 Helicopters flew a total of six sorties dropping 168-55-gallon drums of persistent CS2 on the fields from an altitude of 4000 ft AGL. Visual reconnaissance revealed 100% of the drums landed within the target areas and approximately 75% of the crops were effectively covered with CS2.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(5) During the reporting period the following missions were performed:

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Airborne Personnel Detector	71	71	N/A
PHIS Slurry	7	9	700 Gallons
Flame Drop	73	336	3,622 Drums
Bulk CS2 (persistent)	4	10	280 Drums
	17	36	72 BLU-52s
Tactical CS (non-persistent)	34	54	413 BL58 Cannisters
Defoliation			
Herbicide, Agent Blue	19	49	2,775 Gallons
Defoliation (con't)			
Aerial Diesel	6	20	1,660 Gallons
Ground Diesel	12	N/A	21,200 Gallons
Lug-A-Jugs (Agent Blue)	27	33	336 Jugs
ES CS Lncr Tns, Inspect/Install	15	N/A	261/34 Launchers
Fougasse Issued	N/A	N/A	301 Drums
			200 8" Cannisters
Teams Inspect/Install	56	N/A	967/89 Drums
Hush Flares Inspect/Install	24	N/A	154/42 Flares
Maintenance Teams	44	N/A	N/A
Protective Masks Inspected	N/A	N/A	4175 Masks
Repaired/Evac	N/A	N/A	496/386 Masks
Decon App Mll Inspect/Evac	N/A	N/A	0/0 Apparatus
Mity Mites Inspect/Evac	N/A	N/A	5/1 Mity Mites

# CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

PFTs Inspect/Evac	N/A	N/A	25/5 Flamethrowers
Cave Seeding Operations	N/A	N/A	66 Jeeps

## d. Intelligence

### (1) Enemy Situation

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Hq PRITH	BA 611
4th Regt Hq	YC9781
M4B Inf Bn	ZC1897
M4C Inf Bn	ZC6193
5th Regt Hq	YC6382
439th Inf Bn	YC6297
804th Inf Bn	YC9398
810th Inf Bn	YD5715
K32 Rkt Arty Bn	YC7299
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn	YC6995
Chi Thua II Sapper Bn	YC7294
6th Regt Hq	YD3517
800th Inf Bn	YD3725
802d Inf Bn	YD3018
806th Inf Bn	YD4224
K35 Rkt Arty Bn	YD3620
K12 Sapper Bn	YD3918
7th Front Hq	YD2130
812th Regt Hq	YD2025
4th Inf Bn	YD2834
5th Inf Bn	YD1829
6th Inf Bn	YD2730
K19 (AKA 20th) Sapper Bn/304th Division	YD1927
808th Inf Bn	YD3339
814th Inf Bn	YD2840
K34 Rkt Arty Bn	YD2636
K10 Sapper Bn	YD3534
K11 Sapper Bn	YD2546
K12 Trans Bn	YD1327
324B Div	BA 611
803d Regt Hq	YD3415
1st Inf Bn	YD3616

# CONFIDENTIAL

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

UNIT	LOCATION
2d Inf Bn	YD4412
3d Inf Bn	YD3310
U/I Trans Bn	YD2914
29th Inf Regt	YD4306
7th Inf Bn	YD4906
8th Inf Bn	YD4807
9th Inf Bn	YD4208
675th Arty Regt	BA 611
11A Recon Bn	YC3298
Local Force Units	
Phu Loc Special Action Units	ZC0895
Phong Dien Special Action Unit	YD4026
Quang Dien Special Action Unit	YD5122
C115 Local Force Company	YD6515
C116 Local Force Company	YD8304
Phu Vang Special Action Unit	YC9398
Hue City Recon Bn	YD6514
Hq B5 Front	XD9982
12th AT Bn	DMZ
13 Arty Bn	DMZ
14th AA Bn (12.7mm)	DMZ
15th Engr Bn	Unlocated
16th Signal Bn	DMZ
17th Trans Bn	DMZ
19th Med Bn	DMZ
33d Sapper Bn	XD9939
75th AA Bn (12.7mm)	XD9561
304th NVA Div	Unlocated
FE 304th NVA Div	XD9922
9th Inf Regt	XD7738
1st Inf Bn	XD7740
2d Inf Bn	XD8236
3d Inf Bn	Unlocated
24B Inf Regt	Unlocated
66th Inf Regt	XD9533
7th Inf Bn	XD8832
8th Inf Bn	XD8930
9th Inf Bn	YD0530
320th NVA Div	Unlocated
48th Inf Regt	Unlocated

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
52d Inf Regt	Unlocated
64th Inf Regt	Unlocated
325th NVA Div (AKA 308)	Unlocated
36th Inf Regt	Unlocated
88th Inf Regt	Unlocated
102d Inf Regt	Unlocated
27th Inf Regt (Indep)	YD0668
1st Inf Bn	YD0563
2d Inf Bn	YD0570
3d Inf Bn	YD0459
31st Local Force Group	YD1185
27th Inf Bn	YD1185
138th Inf Regt (Indep)	Unlocated
246th Inf Regt (Indep)	YD9371
1st Inf Bn	XD9455
2d Inf Bn	XD7944
3d Inf Bn	XD9461
270th Inf Regt (Indep)	YD1986
126th Naval Sapper Regt	YD2189
84th Arty Regt	XL9874
164th Arty Regt	XD9684
204th Arty Regt	Unlocated

(b) August 1970

1 During August the 4th NVA Regiment continued to avoid significant contact, and for the second consecutive month, its activity remained at a generally low level. Elements of the 5th NVA Regiment continued offensive operations, with attacks by fire against Allied installations along the Nam Hoa (D) piedmont and lowland areas. Activity by the 6th Regiment during August was directed against Firebase O'REILLY. They were reinforced by elements of the 29th NVA Regiment, 324B Division. Analysis indicated that the 324B Division possibly was controlling enemy operations in the FSB O'REILLY area. Activity by units of the 7th Front remained subdued, except for the 808th NVA Battalion. On 13 August, the battalion made its third incursion into the Quang Tri (P) lowlands in as many months.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

2 Enemy activity in the B5 Front area of operations (DMZ) continued at a high level throughout the month of August. High points of activity during the month were the incursion into the Hai Lang (D) lowlands by the 3d Battalion/9th Regiment, and the overall eastward deployment of the 9th Regiment to the Quang Tri - Thua Thien border areas. This marked the first time the 304th Division or any other element of the B5 Front had operated this far south, except for the brief appearance of elements of the division in the Hue area during the TET Offensive of 1968. In early August, enemy activity increased significantly in the Firebase BARNETT area. By the end of the month enemy casualties were 124 NVA KIA and two NVA PW. A PW captured from the 15th Engineer Company/246th Infantry Regiment, revealed that the 246th was responsible for constructing a road from Cau Khi, south to Ban Bat (vicinity XD6152) through Laos, and east through Quang Tri (P) to the Khe Sanh area in preparation for the infiltration of the 1st and 2d Battalions/246th Regiment. Analysis of captured documents and PW interrogations revealed that the 20th Sapper Battalion/304th Division had been redesignated the 19th Sapper Battalion.

### (c) September 1970

1 In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, September began with an apparent concentrated effort by the enemy to drive ARVN forces from the mountainous areas. During the month, the enemy employed a total of 1450 rounds of 60mm, 82mm, 120mm mortar, 75mm recoilless rifle and 122mm rocket fire in the Firebase O'REILLY area. Both the 6th and 29th Regiments remained firmly committed around the firebase. Activity continued to be light in the 7th Front area of operations. The 803d Regiment remained uncommitted in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley. Although activity in the 4th Regiment area of operations increased during the month of September, the regiment generally continued to avoid significant contact with Allied units. The overall level of enemy initiated activity decreased in the 5th Regiment AO. The month was marked by limited probes and attacks by fire against US and ARVN installations.

2 Enemy activity in the B5 Front during September showed a 50 percent decrease when compared with August. Evidence was found confirming operations by the 27th NVA Regiment in the central DMZ area, indicating that the unit was refitted and resupplied, and possibly was assuming a more aggressive role. Activity in the western DMZ and in western Quang Tri (P) pointed to the probability of an enemy build-up in the Khe Sanh area, as sensor activations in this area were sustained at a relatively high rate throughout the month. Activity in the area of operations of the 304th Division decreased substantially during September. The 66th Regiment possibly withdrew southward in order to maintain control of the vital infiltration and logistical routes of western Quang Tri (P). Though there was a lack of identifiable contact with the 9th Regiment, it was believed that elements of the regiment may have deployed to the O'REILLY-BARBARA area. At the end of September, intelligence pointed to a possible NVA monsoon offensive in the B5 Front area of operations.

### (d) October 1970

1 During October, the 4th Regiment concentrated on interdicting the Hue-Da-Nang Railroad, but otherwise continued to avoid significant contact.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Activity in the 5th Regiment increased steadily throughout the month, culminating on 22 October with attacks by fire on Camp Eagle and Firebases BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL. Significant contact with the 6th Regiment indicated increased interest in the lowlands as several contacts occurred east of QL-1. Activity in this area dropped significantly with the closing of Firebase O'REILLY. The 7th Front, after a period of little or no consequential activity, ambushed a mine-sweep team on 17 October vicinity YD382378, resulting in two US KIA, seven US WIA, 12 ARVN KIA and 11 NVA KIA. Contact with the 803d Regiment at the beginning of the month was negligible. However, by the end of October, the regiment had completed refitting and was returning to a combat role.

2. Enemy activity in the B5 Front throughout October appeared to be following the basic outline of the Second Phase of the Fall Campaign. This phase consisted of the following steps: collecting information and stockpiling food and equipment, weapons preparation and troop rest, and attacks on selected targets beginning in early November. Firebase FULLER remained a frequent target for attacks by fire. Ground attacks remained at a low level. Significant contacts developed as a result of Allied operations rather than because of enemy operations. On 8 October, in response to heavy sensor activations, Trp C, 3d Sqdn, 17th Cav engaged possible replacements for the 304th Division at XD764357, resulting in 29 NVA KIA. On 14 October 3d Co, 4th Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force at XD964594, resulting in three NVA KIA and miscellaneous supplies and equipment captured.

(e) At the end of the reporting period, enemy units were relocated as follows:

<u>UNITS RELOCATED</u>	<u>NEW LOCATION</u>	<u>OLD LOCATION</u>
Chi Thua I Sapper Bn	YC8195	YC6995
6th Regt HQ	YD2518	YD3517
802d Inf Bn/6th Regt	YD2619	YD3018
KI9 Sapper Bn	YD0520	YD1927
324B Div	YD2717	BA 611
1st Inf Bn/803d Regt	YD3212	YD3616
2d Inf Bn/803d Regt	YD3608	YD4412
29th Regt HQ	YD3317	YD4306
7th Inf Bn/29th Regt	YD0823	YD4906
8th Inf Bn/29th Regt	YD3018	YD4807
9th Inf Bn/29th Regt	YD3319	YD4208
9th Regt/304th Division	YD0925	XL7738
1st Inf Bn/9th Regt	YD0925	XD7740
2d Inf Bn/9th Regt	YD1731	XD8236
7th Inf Bn/66th Regt	XD9836	XD8832
8th Inf Bn/66th Regt	YD0637	XD8903
27th Regt HQ (Indep)	XD9254	YD0668
2d Inf Bn/27th Regt	XD9255	YD0570
246th Regt HQ (Indep)	XD9269	XD9371

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (B2) (U)

<u>UNITS RELOCATED</u>	<u>NEW LOCATION</u>	<u>OLD LOCATION</u>
1st Inf Bn/246th Regt	XD6768	XD9455
2d Inf Bn/246th Regt	XD8336	XD0570
84th Arty Regt	XD9269	XD0874
27th Inf Bn/3 1st Local Force Group	XD1144	XD1185

<u>UNITS NOT PREVIOUSLY LOCATED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
3d Inf Bn/9th Regt/304th Division	XD2938

<u>UNITS NOT PREVIOUSLY CARRIED</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
K3 Sapper Bn	XD2913
29th Sapper Bn/304th Regt	XD1040
2d Arty Bn/164th Arty Regt	XD0765

UNIT IDENTIFICATION REDESIGNATED

<u>NEW NAME</u>	<u>OLD NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Huong Thuy Special Action Unit	CL16 Local Force Co	XD7818

(2) Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Activities in Thua Thien (P)

(a) August 1970

1. The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased from 38 in July to 46 in August. There was a significant increase in sabotage activity and a slight increase reported for propaganda and assassination incidents. However, the majority of the incidents (80%) were , rice/tax collection, and sabotage incidents. Attacks by fire against US installations increased, while attacks against GVN and ARVN installations decreased. There were two separate incursions into the lowlands by the NVA during August. Both of these incidents occurred in Hai Lang (D), Quang Tri (P), indicating a continuing enemy interest in this area. During the month of August, a total of nine VCI were neutralized by GVN and Allied operations within Thua Thien (P). Of this number, none were considered significant under current MACV standards.

(b) September 1970

The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased significantly from 46 in August to 29 in September. Terrorism and rice/tax collection, however, remained at approximately the same level as in August. These two categories constituted 70% of the total number of incidents. I



# CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

It was reported that the VC/VCI were attempting to infiltrate into the lowlands by breaking up the Special Action Units into smaller teams to facilitate the gathering of rice. This reflects the success of Allied efforts to stop VC/VCI rice collection during the September harvest. VCI neutralization for the month of September totaled 13, with six being village level or below, while seven were district level or higher.

## (c) October 1970

The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased significantly from 29 in September to 19 in October, the lowest monthly total since July 1969. Rice/tax collection incidents (eight) continued to constitute the largest single category of incidents. There were two intelligence gathering incidents during the month, marking the first such attempts recorded since January 1970. During September, October and November 1969 there was an average of 42 VC/VCI incidents per month. This year's sharp decrease in incidents could result from a weakened VC/VCI organization, resulting from the increased effectiveness of recent RF, PF, and USDF operations. The following table compares the VC/VCI incidents for August (left), September (center), and October (right) by District:

DISTRICT	YTH/BOON	PROP	SAB	INTEL	KID	ASSAS	TERROR	TOTAL
Phong Dien	1/1/4	4/1/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	1/0/0	4/6/1	11/8/6
Huong Dien	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Quang Dien	2/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	3/0/0
Huong Tra	0/0/0	2/0/0	1/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	0/1/0	4/1/0
Huong Thuy	1/2/1	1/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	2/1/1	5/4/2
Phu Bang	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/0/0	1/1/0
Phu Thu	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0
Phu Loc	4/3/3	0/0/0	7/3/1	0/0/0	2/0/1	1/0/0	1/0/0	15/6/5
Vinh Loc	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/1/1
Nam Hoa	3/3/1	0/1/2	0/0/0	0/0/2	0/0/0	0/1/0	1/1/0	4/6/5
Hue	0/0/0	1/0/0	2/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	3/1/0
TOTAL	11/10/9	8/4/2	11/4/1	0/0/2	2/0/2	4/1/1	10/10/2	45/29/19

## (3) G2 Air Operations

(a) During the reporting period, 498 photo targets were scheduled to be flown by direct support aircraft. Of this figure, a total of 300 were completed. A total of 391 infrared targets were scheduled, and 162 were completed. The major cause of incomplete missions was bad weather, particularly during October.

(b) Infrared missions were concentrated within single brigade areas of operations to avoid boundary areas and thereby expediting artillery clearances.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

On 8 October, a meeting was held with representatives from the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company to discuss the effectiveness of the infrared surveillance program. A series of tests conducted by the 131st indicated the optimum operational altitude for their infrared system to be between 1500 feet and 2000 feet above ground level. As a result of this meeting, a new series of preplanned infrared targets was prepared with the main consideration being the altitude of terrain features in the target area. Targets were planned to allow the aircraft to fly close to the optimum altitude over the majority of the terrain in each target area.

(c) Photo targets scheduled by G2 Air prior to 24 September were usually strip photos along prominent terrain features (i.e., roads and streams). A few area targets were flown with a requirement for imagery sidelap. The strip targets were easier for the imagery interpreter to plot because of the identifiable terrain features. However, the amount of activity on the imagery was only a small portion of the total enemy activity believed to be in that target area. On 24 September, a new policy was instituted for developing photo targets. A new format was used to provide coverage of two km x four km areas including a recognizable terrain feature. Keeping within the guidelines set forth by the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company that no more than four passes be made over a Priority III target area, the new format was determined to be acceptable when the requirement for sidelap was deleted. The intelligence gained from these area targets has shown a significant increase over the old system of strip targets. However, the strip target remains a valuable aid for surveillance of infiltration routes and avenues of approach into the lowlands.

#### (4) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations

(a) The DART I sensor readout station continued to readout and interpret sensors in the division reconnaissance zone. DART I has successfully replaced manual readout in the Batcat aircraft. Batcat, an Air Force EC-121, now functions entirely as an airborne antenna relay for DART I. DART I is currently being modified to accommodate Phase III sensor equipment. The addition of Phase III sensor equipment, coupled with the increased analytical capability of DART I over the manual readout system, will enable ground surveillance operations to continue to develop as a major asset in monitoring enemy movement in the division reconnaissance zone. Although reliance upon the DART I system has increased, particularly during the northeast monsoon, the Air Force reduced the on-station time for Batcat from 24 hours to 21 hours. However, this three-hour period when Batcat is not on-station falls during the daylight hours when sensor activity is generally low.

(b) The number of Patrol Seismic Intrusion Devices increased from 147 to 209, which attains the division goal of two sets per line platoon.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) During the reporting period, the number of ground monitor sites decreased from eleven to ten. The sites at FB RIFORD (YD3419), Lang Co Bridge (AT8895), FB KATHRYN (YD4711), FB VEGHEL (YD5503) and FB BASTOGNE (YD6309) were closed. The following sites were opened: OP CHLOMATE (YD6308), "USS Screaming Eagle" (A18598), FB BRICK (YD8399), and FB JACK (YD4928).

(d) In anticipation of the limitations which weather conditions will impose on the majority of available surveillance systems during the northeast monsoon, the division is expanding its electronic ground surveillance system to provide greater coverage throughout the division. Phase III equipment has been requisitioned for ground monitor sites. Upon receipt of this equipment, the division's electronic surveillance capability will allow coverage of areas inaccessible to visual surveillance. Phase III sensors are already being emplaced in the division reconnaissance zone. This added sensor coverage will be of considerable value in the surveillance program when adverse weather conditions preclude aerial reconnaissance for extended periods of time.

(e) There was a significant decrease in sensor activation during the reporting period. During August, the activations dropped to an average of 60 per week, and fell to an average of 40 per week in September. Most activity noted during these months occurred in the division reconnaissance zone, specifically, along Routes 616, 922, 9222, 548 and 17.

(f) Radars operating in the brigade areas of operation continued to detect enemy movement. An average of 44 radar sightings per week were recorded during the months of August and September. Increased emphasis has been placed on the maintenance of radars to the 801st Maintenance Battalion, resulting in a greatly reduced radar down-time.

### (5) Counterintelligence Section

(a) During the reporting period, the Counterintelligence Section continued to provide the division with intelligence support in the areas of sabotage, espionage, subversion, personnel security and physical security. Seven cases of possible espionage, five cases of security violations, six cases of possible dissidence and five cases involving Kit Carson Scouts, daily hire civilians and security clearances were investigated by the section.

(b) The PSI Section continued to validate security clearances within the division. The office performed a total of 7853 PSI actions: 275 crypto accesses were granted; 559 USAIRM checks were made; 3792 local files checks were conducted; 70 BI and NAC requests were processed; 478 SECRET, INTERIM SECRET, TOP SECRET and INTERIM TOP SECRET clearances were granted; five PSI cases were handled; 1362 new personnel were processed; and 1312 clearances were validated.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) During the reporting period, a total of 119 operations involving safe openings, recovery of lost combinations, combination changes and lock and safe repair were conducted. The Counterintelligence Section also provided a DASE (Defense Against Sound Equipment) trained agent who conducted a preliminary survey of the DTGC.

(6) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section continued to monitor, analyze and report the enemy situation throughout Northern Military Region I. Continuing emphasis was placed on the timely dissemination of the collected intelligence to all consumers. Change 4 to the Order of Battle Handbook was published during the reporting period. An addition was made to the Division Collection Plan in order to present collection agencies with 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) essential elements of information (EII). The Order of Battle section assisted G-5 in preparing a handbook on enemy units to be used in targeting psychological operations.

(7) Interrogation Section. During the reporting period, the IFW Section, 101st Military Intelligence Company (Divisional), processed six prisoners of war (four NVA/PW, two VC/PW), one VC Hoi Chanh, and 84 batches of enemy documents captured by units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). In addition, 58 prisoners of war (41NVA/PW, 17 VC/PW), two VCI, and 13 ralliers (eight NVA/HC, five VC/HC), and an unknown number of enemy document batches from ARVN units in the tactical area were processed.

### (8) Weather

#### (a) August

1 The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 4.3 inches which is 0.4 inches more than expected. Thunderstorm activity was higher than normal with 10 thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 15 recorded over the mountains. No ceilings less than 1000 feet were recorded over the coastal plain. Fog was recorded on four days, but visibility was restricted for only a few hours each day. Maximum temperatures were two degrees higher than normal, with an average maximum temperature of 95 degrees Fahrenheit. Minimum temperatures remained at their seasonal average of 77 degrees Fahrenheit.

2 Bad weather restricted airmobile operations on three days during August. Operations by the 2d Sqdn (Aqbl) 17th Cavalry were delayed on 7 and 8 August by bad weather. On 18 August, rain and limited visibility caused cancellation of 18 TAC Air sorties and one company-sized assault.

#### (b) September

1 The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 16.3 inches, which was about an inch more than normal.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Thunderstorm activity was above normal with 10 thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 20 over the mountains. Ceilings less than 1000 feet were observed on six days. Ceilings less than 300 feet occurred on four days. Fog occurred on three days, but visibility was restricted for only a few hours each day. Maximum temperatures were four degrees higher than normal with an average temperature of 92 degrees Fahrenheit. Minimum temperatures remained near their seasonal average of 75 degrees Fahrenheit.

2. Airmobile operations were restricted for only three days during September. High winds and clouds restricted aerial reconnaissance of the division reconnaissance zone on 2 September. High winds and clouds restricted aerial reconnaissance and movement in the southern and western portions of the AO on 27 September. On 30 September, heavy rain, low ceilings and high winds caused the cancellation of three battalion-size moves.

### (c) October

1. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 47.19 inches which is approximately 25 inches above normal. Thunderstorm activity was lower than normal with two thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and one over the mountains. Ceilings less than 1000 feet were observed on 14 days. Ceilings less than 300 feet were observed on 1 day. Fog occurred on 16 days and occasionally lasted the entire day. Both maximum and minimum temperatures were two degrees lower than normal. Maximum temperature averaged 81 degrees Fahrenheit, and minimum temperature averaged 70 degrees Fahrenheit.

2. During October airmobile operations were restricted for thirteen days and were cancelled on four other days. On 1-3, 19-22, and 26-31 October, persisting low clouds, high winds, and heavy rains restricted use of divisional aircraft assets. Impending typhoon conditions halted operations on 15, 16, 24 and 25 October.

### (d) Precipitation Data in Inches (Coastal Lowlands).

	<u>Maximum</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Minimum</u>	<u>Actual</u>
August	14.8	3.9	0.1	4.3
September	37.6	15.5	2.7	16.3
October	75.1	22.3	0.1	47.2

### e. Personnel

(1) Chaplain. During this period the religious program of the division has been carried on without notable problems. All division and attached units have been provided with chaplain coverage.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

The availability of air transportation continues to be the key to the success of the program. A total of 3,754 religious services were conducted with attendance of 59,381.

(2) Finance. During the reporting period, the division finance office continued the use of Mobile Finance Team to provide full spectrum finance services to personnel located on fire support bases. The team periodically visits fire support bases, permitting personnel to benefit from services such as partial payments, allotment changes, sale of treasury checks, collection for savings deposit program, and acceptance of pay complaints. Conversion of military payment certificates to series 692 was initiated on 7 October. The 101st Military Police Company assisted division finance in the initial notification process and provided security throughout conversion operations. Conversion was completed with no significant difficulties.

(3) Staff Judge Advocate. Court-martial and Article 15 statistics for the reporting period are as follows.

- 1 General courts-martial cases tried - 8
- 2 Special courts-martial cases tried - 137
- 3 Summary courts-martial cases tried - 3
- 4 Article 15's - 1265
- 5 Bad conduct special courts-martial cases tried - 9
- 6 Courts-martial and Article 15's involving command interest offenses:

	<u>GMC</u>	<u>SPCM</u>	<u>SPCM BCD</u>	<u>ART 15</u>
Currency manipulations	0	0	0	0
Blackmarket activities	0	0	0	0
Narcotics	2	2	0	7
Marihuana	0	19	3	56
Offenses against RVN civil-ians				
personal	0	1	0	0
property	0	0	0	0

(3) Key personnel roster as of 31 October 1970 and changes in command and staff assignments which occurred during the reporting period:

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

CG	MG John J. Hennessey
ALC(O)	BG Sidney B. Berry
ADC(S)	BG Olin E. Smith promoted to Brigadier General Sep 27
CofS	COL Hugh A. MacDonald
CO, 1st Bde	COL Paul F. Gorman
CO, 2d Bde	COL Walter H. Root
CO, 3d Bde	COL Benjamin L. Harrison
CO, DISCOM	COL David E. Grange
CO, Div Arty	COL Lee E. Surut
CO, 101st Avn Gp	LTC (P) E. P. Davis
ACofS G1	LTC C. M. Barlow succeeded LTC C. A. Hoenstine, Jr. 26 Oct
ACofS G2	MAJ D. S. Johnson succeeded LTC J. S. Cronen 14 Sep
ACofS G3	LTC R. J. Young
ACofS G4	LTC C. M. Kicklighter succeeded MAJ P. Masterson 29 Aug
ACofS G5	LTC H. Purcell succeeded MAJ H. W. Kinnison 7 Aug
Chem Off	LTC C. Jackson succeeded LTC J. R. Klugh 1 Sep
Div Surg	LTC E. Day
PM	LTC J. Lobodinski
IG	LTC Narvaez
SJA	LTC R. S. Hawley succeeded LTC C. W. Welborn 11 Sep
Fin Off	LTC W. J. Falconer
Chap	LTC J. P. Smolinski succeeded LTC C. E. Keys Jr. 16 Aug
AG	LTC T. E. Minix
CO, 1st Bn (Ambl) 327th Inf	LTC G. H. Neroutsos succeeded LTC D. A. Yoder 8 Aug

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

CO, 2d Bn (Ambl) 327th Inf	LTC J. J. Gerda succeeded LTC E. F. Pickett 1 Sep
CO, 2d Bn (Ambl) 502d Inf	LTC C. J. Shay
CO, 1st Bn (Ambl) 501st Inf	LTC A. C. Dister succeeded LTC T. S. Aaron 28 Sep
CO, 2d Bn (Ambl) 501st Inf	LTC M. A. Boos succeeded LTC O. W. Livingston Jr. 20 Oct
CO, 1st Bn (Ambl) 502d Inf	LTC R. N. Lang succeeded LTC A. E. West 16 Sep
CO, 1st Bn (Ambl) 506th Inf	LTC B. B. Porter
CO, 2d Bn (Ambl) 506th Inf	LTC J. C. Bard
CO, 3d Bn (Ambl) 187th Inf	LTC B. J. Sutton succeeded LTC I. C. Bland 26 Oct
CO, 3d Bn (Ambl) 506th Inf	LTC J. E. Martling
CO, 2d Bn (Ambl) 11th Arty	LTC R. J. Bu
CO, 2d Bn (Ambl) 319th Arty	LTC E. S. Korpel succeeded LTC W. A. Walker 18 Oct
CO, 2d Bn (Ambl) 320th Arty	MAJ (P) H. H. Brandt succeeded LTC A. B. Davis 26 Oct
CO, 1st Bn (Ambl) 321st Arty	LTC J. L. Zorn succeeded LTC A. A. Ely Jr. 15 Aug
CO, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty) 77th Arty (Ambl)	LTC G. L. Nowalk
CO, 2d Sqdn (Ambl) 17th Cav	LTC R. F. Molinel
CO, 101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl)	LTC W. N. Peachey

CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

CO, 158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl)	LTC R. J. Gerard
CO, 159th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl)	LTC G. F. Newton
CO, 326th Engr Bn	LTC C. P. Rodolph
CO, 326th Med Bn (Ambl)	LTC R. E. Day
CO, 5th Trans Bn (Ambl)	LTC H. I. Small
CO, 426th S&S Bn (Ambl)	LTC E. R. Jacobs succeeded LTC R. M. Bowman 10 Aug
CO, 801st Maint Bn (Ambl)	LTC R. L. Nidever succeeded LTC J. F. Dunn 6 Oct
CO, 501st Signal Bn (Ambl)	LTC R. W. Smartt

## f. Logistics.

(1) General. Logistic support for all division operations was provided through DISCOM forward service support elements (FSE), using the area support concept. Throughout the period, a conscious effort was made to offset the reduction of blade time resulting from adverse weather conditions. DISCOM continued to provide civic action support in District II, HUE City and to assist THUA THIEN Province in upgrading the capabilities of the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center (SM&DSLCC). At the end of the reporting period, five projects remain to be completed.

(2) DISCOM continued to provide Super Contact Teams to units returning from operations for refresher training. The number of battalion or company size marshalling operations conducted during the reporting period are as follows.

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>Complete</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Total</u>
1/501	15	18	33
1/327	10	6	16
2/502	<u>20</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>35</u>
	45	39	84

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Complete</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>Total</u>
1/502	10	5	15
2/501	5	13	18
3/506	10	0	10
2/327	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>
	32	24	56
<u>3d Bde</u>			
3/187	15	5	20
1/506	10	10	20
2/506	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>15</u>
	36	19	55

(3) The 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Ampl) continued to provide direct support maintenance for repair of the 424 aircraft authorized the division.

(a) During the reporting period, 684 aircraft were received on work orders from divisional aviation units and 633 were released back to the units. On 16 September 1970, the battalion was given overall responsibility for supplying support for the conversion of the CH47 Super C aircraft back to the normal CH47C configuration, requiring the change out of 54 T55-L11 engines, and replacement with 54 T55-L7C engines. Conversion was begun on 17 Oct 70 and by the end of this reporting period 17 aircraft conversions had been completed. The conversion program has gone smoothly and all aircraft are expected to be completed by 8 Nov 70. The battalion also performed its first 18th PMP on a CH47 aircraft, during this period. The PMP was accomplished by contract personnel assigned to B Company, 5th Transportation Battalion, during the period 4-29 Oct 70, requiring 25 days and 2200 manhours.

(b) Documentation, classification, and retrograde of turned-in equipment and supplies has kept both DSU's working around the clock. In October, the battalion retrograded 5,322 serviceable lines valued at \$422,232.67 and 1,145 lines of unserviceable supplies valued at \$5,159,782.92. The present authorized stockage list of the two tech supplies totals approximately 11,760 lines. The battalion processed 40,583 requisitions during this period.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(4) The 801st Maintenance Battalion (Ambl) continued to provide direct support maintenance to divisional units. A recapitulation of support maintenance activity during the reporting period is as follows:

<u>COMMODITY</u>	<u>BEGIN</u>	<u>DEADLINE RATE</u> <u>END</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>
Armament	.15%	.12%	.12%
Signal	3.3%	2.5%	2.8%
Automotive	2.9%	3.0%	2.7%

\* % deadline of total authorized

	<u>JOBS RECEIVED</u>	<u>JOBS COMPLETED</u>
Signal	6816	6824
Automotive	828	811
Engineer	839	800
Armament	1806	1873
Service	945	963
Instrument	954	930

(a) Technical Supply Activities. The 801st Maintenance Battalion technical supply continued to process an average of approximately 22,153 requests per month. Demand satisfaction has fluctuated somewhat on a weekly basis with an average for the period of 59%, while demand accommodation remained almost constant, averaging 80%. Demand satisfaction reached a high of 60%, while demand accommodation has been maintained at 79.7%. Receipt of major assemblies has increased greatly, resulting in a low deadline rate in each major commodity area.

(b) M16A1 barrel exchange program. During the quarter the battalion up-graded M16A1 rifles. Over 18,500 barrels have been inspected and over 4,000 old barrels have been replaced.

(5) The 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Ambl) continued to provide basic supply support to the division by air and ground means. The battalion rigged external sling loads of Class I, II, III, IV and V requiring 5,660

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

air-sorties during the reporting period. Battalion trucks drove 55,003 miles during the quarter, delivering 2,975 passengers, 1644 short tons of freight, 1,196,794 gallons of water and 277,868 gallons of fuel.

### g. Civil Affairs

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province continued at a high rate during the reporting period. In these three months, 77 projects were completed, and at the end of the period 62 were in progress. The overall effort of the division is directed toward the achievement of the national objectives outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacification and Development Plan, 1970. All efforts are closely coordinated with GVN officials, and all operations are undertaken at the request of the province chief. The province Civic Action Priority List, developed at the hamlet, village and district level and consolidated and approved at the province level, serves as the guideline in the selection of projects to be undertaken.

(a) During the period, phase I of the "Vietnamization" program has concluded with considerable success. Between 15 August and 8 October, complete responsibility for control of cement issue for military civic action projects was passed by 101st Abn Div (Ambl) G5 to Thua Thien Province Property Book Officer. Additionally, combined district inspection of all military civic action projects in the province was undertaken. This resulted in identifying weaknesses, improving reporting, increasing impetus for completing projects, and establishing closer ties between province, district, village and hamlet officials.

(b) Phase II of the civic action "Vietnamization" program will involve the passage of responsibility for the control and allocation of all civic action supplies now stored at the G5 warehouse to the Thua Thien Province Property Book Officer.

The decision to move into phase II was based on the successful assumption of responsibility by province for receiving, controlling and issuing the 2,000 bags of cement moved from Camp Eagle during phase I above. Excellent cooperation and understanding which exists between Thua Thien Province officials and their CORDS advisors has made this progress possible.

(2) The Phu Luong Hospital was dedicated and opened for outpatient care of expectant mothers during the reporting period. Work on this facility, which will have an inpatient capacity of 200, is in response to a request from the Thua Thien Province Chief and the Province Senior Advisor. Materials issued from the G5 warehouse in support of the hospital include: 75 bags of cement, 24 rolls of barbed wire, 60 sheets of roofing tin, 160

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

engineer stakes, 900 feet of rebar, two rolls of reinforcing wire, 12 pieces of 42" culvert, 24 pieces of 24" culvert, 126 board feet of 4"x10" lumber, 36 board feet of 4"x6" lumber, and eight board feet of 4"x4" lumber. Additionally, from the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) PSYWAR/Civic Action ALK Fund, seven Vietnamese carpenters were hired to construct furniture in the G5 warehouse for the hospital. So far 40 beds, six desks and six benches have been delivered. Six more desks, six benches and 60 night stands are presently under construction. These items will be delivered to Phu Luong Hospital upon completion. The estimated labor cost for the complete project is 149,980 \$VN.

(3) Significant progress was made in the resettlement of 200 Montagnard families (607 people) who had immigrated to Thua Thien Province from Quang Tri Province. A decision was made by province officials to relocate 200 Montagnard families from Cu Chanh IV Hamlet (YD 747166) in Nam Hoa District to Lien Bang (YD 746135) also in Nam Hoa. Coordination for the operation was effected by the CORUS War Victims Advisor, the Nam Hoa District Senior Advisor, the division, and the 5th and 7th Platoons of the 29th Civil Affairs Company. Land was cleared by the 27th Engineer Bn and framing lumber for house construction was procured from XXIV Corps and delivered by the 7th Platoon. Five GP medium tents were delivered by the 7th Platoon for use as temporary shelter. The 7th Platoon has continued to deliver framing lumber and scrap plywood from the G5 warehouse, and also delivered 500 ammo boxes which were assembled by the S5 of the 1/502 Inf Bn. To date 326 pieces of framing lumber (2"x4"x14" and 4"x4"x14"), 500 ammo boxes and 2,800 board feet of scrap plywood have been delivered. Province has provided tin roofing for the houses. A total of 100 two-family dwellings are planned, and to date 21 houses have been completely finished.

(4) Thua Thien Province has continued to make steady progress in its Return to Village (RTV) program. Phase II of the 1970 RTV program started on 1 July 1970 and ended 31 October 1970. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1970, a total of 448 families (2,728 people) were returned to their ancestral homes. Of these, 309 families (1,507 people) have already received their RTV payment (10 sheets of tin and 7,500 \$VN). The great majority of the returnees have, since 1 August, been resettled in Phu Thu District. A few have returned to hamlets in Quang Dien District. The Phu Thu RTV was directed by the 7th Platoon of the 29th Civil Affairs Company, which secured trucks from province and the 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for the move. To date, Thua Thien has resettled 64,226 of the 85,114 refugees during and after Tet of 1968.

(5) The 501st Signal Bn completed a poultry house in Hue City, chickens imported from Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, and hatcheries in the Saigon area will soon be supplementing the diets of the inhabitants of the An Hoa old

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Folke Home. Present GVN programs provide only 15 cents a day for food for these people, and a dietary protein deficiency exists. During the reporting period a poultry house was completed on the grounds of the home. Some 200 chicks per cycle will be purchased when one day old at a cost of between 35 and 50 \$VN. After 10 weeks, some will be sold at a profit of about 70 \$VN per chick, and the rest will be kept for consumption. Those sold will keep the project self-sustaining while the meat from those consumed will alleviate the protein shortage.

(6) During the period of this report a total of 394 MEDCAPs were held and 19,644 medical and dental patients were examined.

(7) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

- (a) Loc Son Village bridge repair (YD 930008), Phu Loc.
- (b) Co Buu Hamlet school repair (YD 705227), Huong Tra.
- (c) Thuong Bang Hamlet bridge (YD 768143), Nam Hoa.
- (d) Ha Trung Hai Hamlet village office (YD 965175), Phu Thu.
- (e) Van Trinh Hamlet school (YD 515471), Phong Dien.
- (f) Dong Luu Hamlet school furniture (ZD 085012), Phu Loc.
- (g) An Luong Dong Hamlet school furniture (YD 987057), Phu Loc.
- (h) Phu Cuong Hamlet market repair (ZD 145001), Phu Loc.
- (i) Ke Mon Village school repair (YD 568464), Huong Dien.
- (j) District HQ - Hue II conference room (YD 769237), Hue II.
- (k) Phuoc Loc Hamlet road repair (ZD 185015), Phu Loc.
- (l) Lieu Quan Hamlet school construction (YD 513452), Phong Dien.
- (m) Pho Trach Hamlet school construction (YD 506437), Phong Dien.
- (n) Luong Mai Hamlet school construction (YD 525440), Phong Dien.
- (o) An La Hamlet aid station (YD 625308), Phong Dien.
- (p) Con Son Hamlet pipeline (YD 540340), Phong Dien.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

- (q) An Hoa Hamlet poultry house (YD 742225), Hue I.
- (r) Thuy Dong Hamlet footbridge (ZD 191004), Phu Loc.
- (s) Loc Hai Village school construction (AT 890965), Phu Loc.
- (t) Van La Hamlet school repair (YD 859159), Huong Tra.
- (u) Trach Huu Hamlet school construction (YD 519396), Phong Dien.
- (v) Loc Bon Village market repair (YD 927094), Phu Loc.
- (w) Tan Nguyen Hamlet school repair (YD 527346), Phong Dien.

(8) During the reporting period 77 projects were completed. This number includes 13 schools, one dispensary, two administrative buildings, 52 wells, three bridges, and six others.

(9) The division currently has 62 civic action projects underway. These include four schools, eight dispensaries, two administrative buildings, one library, 21 wells, one footbridge, seven markets, eight washstands, four road repairs, one pier, and five others.

(10) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

Cement	766 bags
Tin	277 sheets
Lumber	49,021 board feet
Scrap lumber	6,940 board feet
Nails	146 kilos
Masonite	8 sheets
Paint	18 gals
PSP	198 sheets
Ammo boxes	4,259 boxes
Culvert	214 sections

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ECS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Reinforcing wire	3 rolls
Peneprime	18 gals
Dirt fill	4,200 cubic yards
Barbed wire	36 rolls
Engr stakes	306 stakes
Sand bags	2,500 bags
Tint	7 kilos
Lime	25 bags
Sand	7 tons
Screen	9 rolls
Damaged pallets	75 pallets
Food	18,414 pounds
Clothing	1,735 pounds
Soap	206 pounds
Medical supplies	262 pounds
Desks	120 desks
Benches	120 benches
Blackboards	46 each
Beds	40 each
School kits	50 kits
English books	40 books
Swing	1 swing
Seesaw	1 each
Firewood	1 trailer



## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

### h. Psychological Operations.

(1) Four separate atrocities were perpetrated by the enemy against the local populace of Thua Thien Province prior to daybreak on 2 August 70. Detachment 4, 7th PSYOP Bn, OPCON to 2d Brigade, 101st Abn Div (Ambl), reacted to these incidents by immediately coordinating with the districts involved and deployed their ground teams to the sites. Upon arriving, they were met by representatives of the Vietnamese Information Service and together collected the anti-GVN and anti-FWMAF leaflets that had been distributed by the enemy. Immediately upon arrival, the ground loudspeaker teams began broadcasting pro-GVN messages and the effect of the VC propaganda was effectively negated. Photographs and tape recorded interviews were made for possible future use.

(2) Two quick reaction aerial broadcast missions were conducted in support of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) on 12 and 14 Aug 70. The broadcasts were directed at elements of the 3d Bn, 9th NVA Regiment which had sustained 199 KIA, 17 PWs and five ralliers within a three day period.

(3) A 2LT rallier was received by a reconnaissance element of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) on 12 Aug 70 in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. For the following six days, the Hoi Chanh was exploited solely as a source of current intelligence on enemy activities in the area. On 18 Aug 70, the Hoi Chanh made a Chieu Hoi tape directed at his former unit, 6th Company, K-10 Bn, 6th NVA Regiment, where the Hoi Chanh had been a political commissar since the unit's arrival in South Vietnam. The tape was used against the 6th Regt during the period of 19 - 20 and 23 - 24 August 1970. No positive results from the missions were noted except for an increased amount of hostile fire directed at PSYOP aircraft. A translation of the Hoi Chanh's tape follows:

"Dear comrades of KI/6 Co. Can you identify me? I am LT Le Ba Que, Political Commissar of KI/6 Co. Do you remember that the Bn CO (Duong) and the Political Commissar (Co Van Seu) told us many times about plans to encircle the enemy? After several days of fighting, do you see any of our comrades who fought with us in the front? What has happened? I hope any survivors still on the 652 mountain (FSB O'REILLY) become clearheaded enough to understand the hollow promise of our cadre. I advise you to allow yourself the opportunity to rally to the GVN like me or go back home, leaving the battlefield. Do you know that no one buried Minh, Phi, Link, Chieu or Sang of C1/K1 who died on top of 652 mountain?"

(4) On 16 Aug 70, the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) captured an NVA PFC from the 5th Co, 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regt. After interrogation of the PW and review of captured documents pertaining to the same battalion, the division PSYOP section initiated a three day campaign against the 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regt

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

During the period 23-25 August 1970. The themes used during this campaign were as follows:

- (a) Your Leaders Lie.
- (b) Sick and Wounded.
- (c) Food and Medical Treatment.
- (d) Allied Air and Ground Fire Power.
- (e) Helicopters and B52's.
- (f) Malaria.

(5) During the period 7-15 Aug, the 4th Detachment ground teams provided 43 broadcast hours in support of the village and hamlet elections held on 16 Aug 70. A detailed breakdown of the districts covered follows:

<u>District</u>	<u>Broadcast Hours</u>
Huong Tra	16
Phong Dien	6
Huong Thuy	13
Phu Thu	4
Nam Hoa	<u>4</u>
Total	43

(6) Urging voters to get out and vote during the national elections held on 30 August 1970 was the theme of a joint US/VIS PSYOP campaign conducted during the period 19-29 Aug. Again support was provided by the 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn. The program was designed to instill a feeling of democracy in the people and to get them to the polls with a reassurance of their personal safety. A detailed breakdown of hours by district was as follows:

<u>District</u>	<u>Broadcast Hours</u>
Huong Thuy	19
Phu Loc	11

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOA-65 (R2) (U)

Phu Vang	6
Huong Tra	14
Nam Hoa	17
Phong Dien	29
Phu Thu	8
Quang Dien	10
Total	114

(7) The Voluntary Informant Program (VIP) received greater emphasis within the division at the onset of the northeast monsoon. The program is designed to restrict the VC/NVA from gaining food, shelter and control within the lowland villages and hamlets. In coordination with province officials, the ground loudspeaker and audio-visual teams, in direct support of the division, broadcasted more than 40 hours of the VIP theme from 1-15 Sep 70. The same teams disseminated over 30,000 reward handouts in the lowland districts.

(8) A change in brigade TAOs within the lowlands was effected at the termination of Operation TEXAS STAR, aligning the four northern districts of the province with the 3d Bde. With this change of alignment, two ground loudspeaker teams were transferred from the 2d Bde to the 3rd Bde. The change was completed on 20 Sep 70.

(9) In response to a quick reaction leaflet request from the 1st Bde, G5 PSYOP printed 20,000 leaflets on 26 Sep 70. The leaflets were dropped the following day by the brigade. The leaflet was targeted against the 5th NVA Regt with a rally appeal theme.

(10) On 22 September, the division was visited by XXIV Corps and MACV POLWAR staff members in lieu of the Corps Quarterly PSYOP/POLWAR Conference. A G5 briefing was presented covering the 101st Abn Div (Ambl) activities in civil affairs, civic action and psychological operations. The briefing concluded with an aerial broadcast and "Earlyword" demonstration.

(11) A Hoi Chanh rallied to the village chief of Quang Phuoc, Quang Dien District at 1300 hrs, 8 Oct 70. He was the Military Proselytizing Chief for Quang Phuoc Village and a member of the Quang Dien Special Action Unit (3DSAU). Upon notification of the Hoi Chanh, the 3d Bde requested leaflets to exploit the information received from the rallier. The leaflets were requested through XXIV Corps G5 PSYOP, developed and printed by the 7th PSYOP

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RSC CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Bn, and disseminated by the 9th SOS over the target within sixteen hours. The Hoi Chanh led government forces to numerous bunkers in northern Thua Thien Province, accounting for six enemy KIA, five PW, and capture of individual weapons, ammo and medical supplies.

(12) A combined operation including the 1st Bde and 3d Regt (ARVN) was supported by division PSYOP and 1st Bde PSYOP. Four priority leaflets requested by CO 1st Bde were developed by 7th PSYOP for dissemination by the brigade during the operation. The leaflets were rally appeals and instructions on how to rally within the specific area of operations. Information obtained from documents captured during this operation was used to target known NVA units by name and location. The 1st Bde provided a sketch of the area, related to a NVA map, and erected red beacons to instruct potential ralliers where to rally safely.

(13) At request of the 1st Bde, division PSYOP developed a quick reaction (QR) leaflet, focusing on the "ultra-modern" treatment given to all PWs. The leaflet was targeted against the 4th Co, 810th Bn, 5th NVA Regt. This leaflet was the first of a series of leaflets targeted against the 810th Bn by the 1st Bde. A great majority of these were priority leaflets that were printed by 7th PSYOP Bn and dropped in conjunction with aerial broadcasts with the same general themes. The campaign is continuing at the end of this reporting period.

(14) At the request of the Assistant Province Advisor for PSYOP, the division PSYOP section on 14 Oct 70 dropped 1,000,000 leaflets publicizing the Voluntary Informant Program and Phoenix Program to the people of the lowland areas of Thua Thien Province. A follow-up drop was accomplished on 22 Oct by 2d Bde PSYOP, with another 1,000,000 leaflets with the same themes in the same areas.

(15) In order to publicize President Nixon's new peace proposal, division PSYOP requested a leaflet summarizing his five points. The leaflet was printed by the 7th PSYOP Bn and was dropped exclusively in the canopy to point out to the NVA the unwillingness of NVN to make peace.

(16) In order to inform the people of Phu Loc District of a new curfew going into effect on 15 Oct, the 2d Bde PSYOP section requested a QR leaflet to be developed and printed by division PSYOP. Twenty thousand handbills were turned over to 2d Bde and were distributed the following week by 4th Det, 7th PSYOP Bn ground teams.

### i. Medical

(1) During this reporting period the tactical deployment remained the same as in the previous quarter with Company A in direct support of 1st Bde, Company B in direct support of 2d Bde, Company C in support of the 3d Bde and HQs and Spt Company in support of division rear units located at Camp Eagle.

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

Operation 1 Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

## (2) Medical statistical recapitulation:

	<u>Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Co C</u>	<u>Spt Co</u>	<u>Total</u>
Patients seen at clearing station	2,097	2,070	1,860	2,609	8,636
Dental patients	0	980	1,152	233	2,365
Admissions	130	130	227	335	722
Transferred	125	133	119	45	422
<u>Recapitulation:</u>					
IRMA	80	22	367	27	496
NBC	300	110	551	135	1,096
<u>Medical Diseases:</u>					
Malaria	0	0	2	13	15
FUOs	72	40	53	83	248
Diarrhea	55	60	39	53	207
Skin diseases	200	335	389	331	1,255
N/P	10	17	919	9	957
Foot problems	25	106	93	73	297
Gastroenteritis	29	57	107	37	230
Heat injuries	20	2	13	27	62
VD	120	188	137	53	548
Med-evac missions	-	-	-	-	1,090

(3) The Air Ambulance Platoon continued its mission to provide aero-medical evacuation support to the 101st Airborne Division. The majority of support came from Camp Eagle base camp; however, for most of the period, two UH1H air ambulances have been stationed at Camp Evans to provide quicker response to the northern regions of the area. During this reporting period the one aircraft which had been placed with Division Flight Standards, was

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

returned to the Battalion.

### j. Signal

(1) The 501st Signal Battalion (AMBL) continued its mission to provide communications electronics support for the division. This support was provided in the following areas:

(a) Multi-channel communications: Four channel radio carrier teams supported the three brigade headquarters by providing communications to battalion CP's on Firebases MAUREEN, BARNETT, KATHRYN, ARSENAL, TOMAHAWK, BRICK, RAKEASAN, QUANG TRI, JACK, CHECKMATE, BASTOGNE, BIRMINGHAM, Mai Loc, and Dong Ha, while radio-teletype continued to support the division headquarters, the three brigades, and DISCOM. A division operations and intelligence RATT net was established from DIOC to each brigade and the 101st Avn Group. The battalion also established an FM secure net and division BRCC RATT to carry severe weather warnings during the northeast monsoon. AM and FM RMI stations were also maintained.

(b) The battalion continued its policy of direct exchange of equipment which could not be repaired immediately. Division units were further assisted by contact teams sent to field locations for on-site repairs. There were 1,018 work orders completed during the reporting period.

(2) The four division MARS stations completed 15,899 phone patches during the quarter.

(3) The battalion continued its program of training selected soldiers of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) Signal Battalion. To date, three officers and eleven enlisted men have received two weeks of on-the-job training in theory and operating procedures of various equipment in the battalion.

### k. Army Aviation

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 101st Aviation Group (CBT) (AMBL) continued to perform its mission to provide aviation support to the division and aviation staff personnel to the division special staff. The Pathfinder Platoon, under the operational control of the 101st Aviation Group S-3, successfully completed the following missions:

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>NUMBER ACCOMPLISHED</u>
US and ARVN LZs/PZs	46
US Arty moves	11
ARVN Arty moves	5

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Opening a Fire Support Base	8
US Arty raids	2
ARVN CA's	15

In addition to the above, pathfinders continued to maintain air traffic control at division fire support bases. In conjunction with this mission, pathfinders provided invaluable information on weather conditions. Consequently, valuable blade time was saved. The increased use of pathfinders enhanced the effectiveness of the division's mission. Pathfinders were required to control all ARVN combat assaults.

(2) The 101st Aviation Group S-5 continued to be active in the civic action program, with the MEDCAP II program in Vinh Loc District being stressed. The group headquarters operated two MEDCAPS per week at Vinh Hai village, training two to three Vietnamese health workers each during each visit. This on-the-job training has enabled these Vietnamese to demonstrate continuous improvement in aseptic techniques. This program could continue without support if Vietnamese medical supply channels were improved. Near the end of the reporting period, a new MEDCAP II site was established at the district dispensary. All district health workers and RF/PF medics were trained to handle routine sickness and taught field expedient techniques for treating wounds. Sanitation was continuously stressed. Frequent Medevacs were made to the Vietnamese hospital in Hue and the US medical facility in Phu Bai. Those patients requiring additional medical treatment were brought in on return trips from a MEDCAP operation. This program received full cooperation from health workers and created a favorable impression in the villages.

(3) During this reporting period, communications security was the foremost concern of the Signal Officer. Only tactical callsigns on tactical nets and unclassified callsigns of air traffic control nets were used. Weather permitting, monitoring of aviation unit frequencies was conducted daily, particularly on all large operations. Tape recordings were made and violations in communications security were reported. COMSEC training was increased to two hours per quarter. This aggressive program has reduced violations significantly.

(4) The Air Traffic Control Platoon encounter no major problem during the past quarter. The air traffic control performance for the period is as follows:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Eagle tower	28,245	42,546	18,310	89,101
Liftmaster (PHU BAI)	10,418	9,101	7,900	28,422
Eagle GCA	259	263	247	769

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(5) Accident/incident experience in the 101st Aviation Group for this reporting period is as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Accidents	10
Incidents	22
Forced landings	3
Precautionary landings	31
Combat damaged A/C	20

### 1. Engineer.

(1) On 6 August, Company A assumed the rehabilitation project at FS/OB BASTOGNE, clearing the old 105mm artillery area and cutting slots for pre-fabricated bunkers. As FS/OB MAUREEN was closed, Company A removed the bunkers intact from that firebase by air and emplaced them at BASTOGNE. Based upon an estimate of the engineer and security effort required to keep route 547 open from FS/OB BASTOGNE to FS/OB VEGHEL during the northeast monsoon, it was decided that VEGHEL would be closed before the wet season set in, but would be kept operational for as long as weather permitted. Accordingly, a program was developed to retrograde bunkers from VEGHEL to BASTOGNE by road and by air. Company A executed the program at both ends, dismantling and preparing bunkers for lift out at VEGHEL, and reconstructing and emplacing bunkers at BASTOGNE. The program began at a slow pace in mid-August and accelerated rapidly toward the end of the month as the rainy season approached. A total of 85 bunkers were back-hauled by air and ground operations. On 9 August, Company C, having completed the mess hall at FS/OB BIRMINGHAM, began construction of a mess bunker at BASTOGNE. The structure, 20' x 104', with a concrete floor and built-in drains, was brought near completion by Company C on 1 September and turned over to Company A for finishing touches. On 14 August, Company C began reconstruction of FSB JACK, unoccupied since early May. JACK was constructed as a two-battery FS/OB, incorporating all the lessons learned in firebase construction during the spring and early summer and incorporating a feature not often used in the division area of operations: a perimeter berm. The project was planned and executed by Company C. In early August, enemy mining activity increased, particularly along Route 547 between FS/OBs BASTOGNE and VEGHEL. As a result, daily minesweeps were resumed on the more secure roads and sweeping procedures in all companies were reviewed and adjusted to meet the challenge. Company A, conducting the sweep east from VEGHEL toward BASTOGNE, and non-divisional engineers sweeping west from BASTOGNE, frequently found mines of varying types.

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Throughout August, Company C worked at FS/OBs LOS BANOS and TOMAHAWK clearing mine fields, emplacing wire, building bunkers, and improving the access roads at those locations. On 28 August, one platoon from Company B joined Company C in the construction of FS/OB JACK. Also on 28 August, FS/OB GLADIATOR was closed, and the 64 bunkers emplaced by Company B and all defenses developed through its six-week occupation were left intact. Similarly, KATHRYN was closed and left intact on 31 August as the division adopted its monsoon posture. On 29 August, Company C opened and began reconstruction of FS/OB BRICK. Company C, on 1 September, began construction of a raft for use in Lang Co Bay as a sensor-readout station, a radar and a quad fifty-caliber machine gun platform. A float made of steel pontons, "Navy cubes," was procured, and Company C placed a deck on the float which measured 22' x 77' and constructed a 10' x 30' bunker on the float for living and working space for the personnel manning the facility. Throughout August, all lettered companies performed numerous landing zone construction missions in support of the brigades and the cavalry squadron. On 4 September, Headquarters Company began construction of the Huong Thuy Road, a civic action project, to improve the existing trail between Route QL-1 and the bridge built by Company C in the same area several months before. During July and August, base development and other support projects were accomplished in large numbers. Typical of these, were construction of a post exchange storage facility at CAMP EVANS, billets, and office for the 1st Bde commander at CAMP EAGLE, 3d Bde officers mess at CAMP EVANS, repair of the CERTS rappel tower at Camp Evans, improvement of Company C and 2d Bde areas in Phu Bai, helipad and road maintenance at Camp Eagle, and many other earthwork and minor vertical construction projects.

(2) As Operation JEFFERSON GLEN began, work continued on all active FS/OBs with bunker construction and preparation of the bases for the coming monsoon rains. Monsoon preparations included placing rock on interior and access roads to maintain trafficability; shaping roads to create proper drainage; clearing and lining of drainage ditches to promote effective runoff of water; cleaning, replacement, and addition of culverts and construction of proper headwalls; improvement of drainage around bunkers and other structures; and the use of various other techniques. All bunkers scheduled for retrograde from FS/OB VEGHEL, had been removed by mid-September to BASTOGNE and BIRMINGHAM. Company A began bunker construction and culvert emplacement at BIRMINGHAM on 2 September, and moved into monsoon preparations there as the month progressed. Company C completed initial construction of the raft for Lang Co Bay on 9 September. On 23 September further work was begun to widen the roof of the raft-bunker for a helipad. The roof expansion was not completed by the end of the month due to material shortages. The raft, dubbed the "SS Screaming Eagle," was operational in the Lang Co Bay from 9 September, but was plagued by leakage problems, requiring continual attention from battalion personnel. Company C began bunker construction at FS/OB TOMAHAWK on 12 September and at FS/OB ARSENAL on 13 September; both projects included a 40' x 32' mess bunker.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOL-65 (R2) (U)

At RABANAN in late August and early September, Company B added eleven 10' x 24' and three 8' x 12' bunkers and other miscellaneous structures to the base and through September expended much effort in monsoon preparations at that location. On 19 September, Company B constructed one bunker at the An Lo Bridge. Company A supported the reopening of Old Checkmate on 16 September, and expanded the position into a brigade forward command post complex, clearing fields of fire and cutting slots for bunkers. Eight 8' x 12' bunkers were flown into location, and completion of the bunkers on 2 October marked the end of the project. Several artillery raids and short-term infantry operations were supported by Companies A and C in September; by Company A at FSB NORMANDY, FSB TENNESSEE, and FSB WHIP; and Company C at FSB SLEDGE. In mid-September, Headquarters Company completed all work at the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center facility. This project took over six months. Work at Huong Thuy Road was severely hampered by rain, and the project was eventually suspended in late September. Earlier in the month, Headquarters Company replaced poles supporting radio power lines above the level of a raised dump truck bed. Company A continued the minesweep of Route 547 between BASTOGNE and VIGHEL. Work continued at JACK and BRICK. Companies B and C completed construction of the 90 bunkers at JACK on 26 September, and Company B began concentrating on monsoon preparation there. Company C, at FSB BRICK, completed construction of the 49 bunkers at that location on 28 September and also began to concentrate on monsoon preparations. Development of FSB BASTOGNE progressed well, with 90 bunkers completed at the end of the month and monsoon preparations proceeding concurrent with bunker construction. During September, both Company B at CAMP EVANS and also Company A at CAMP EAGLE accomplished the relocation of numerous SEA huts in support of tenant units at those camps. Company B performed landing zone construction in support of the second and third Brigades and the 2d Sqdn 17th Cav (Airmobile) during the month. Throughout September, Headquarters Company concentrated their efforts to prepare roads on fire support bases for the approaching rains. Headquarters Company, grading and shaping roads and drainage areas, spreading rock, applying penecrime, repairing and replacing culverts, and filling potholes, worked day and night into October with the monsoon preparations. The move of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and Company A into the area vacated by Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 in mid-September was made quickly and efficiently without any decrease in engineer support to the Division.

(3) Company C, on 1 October, began construction of a 40-foot steel stringer bridge on New Providence Road near the 5th Transportation Battalion area at CAMP EAGLE. The single-lane, class 60 bridge was constructed beside an existing single-lane concrete-and-steel bridge to relieve a traffic bottleneck and safety hazard at that location. The bridge was completed on 26 October. Headquarters Company completed rehabilitation of the road to OP-56 on 6 October. In early October, a period of heavy rainfall caused deterioration of roads at CAMP EAGLE and at some fire bases.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters Company redoubled the effort already being put into Eagle roads, and the lettered companies, supported by headquarters equipment, worked at the firebases to repair damage and to upgrade the roads so that additional rain would not cause further deterioration. Road work included grading, compacting, penepripping, filling with rock where necessary, installing and repairing culverts, and other assorted tasks. On 10 October, Company B began construction of latrines which were built at CAMP EVANS and lifted to FS/08 RAKHASAN by UH-1 aircraft. Six latrines were completed by 27 October. Company A returned to OP CHECKMATE on 15 October for additional work on clearing fields of fire, installing defensive wire, and performing minor work on bunkers. Work at OP CHECKMATE was completed on 26 October. From 17 to 21 October, Company B replaced a large section of 60-inch culvert in the 801st Maintenance area at CAMP EVANS. Company A completed bunker construction at FS/02 BASTOGNE on 18 October, with a total of one hundred-seven 8' x 12' bunkers, seven 10' x 24' bunkers, and a 20' x 104' mess bunker constructed since early August. Also on 18 October, Company A began construction of four aviation turning-markers for aircraft control points outside CAMP EAGLE. The 16-foot-high structures were built in the shape of truncated pyramids with checkerboard-panelled sides. On 18 October, Company C completed widening the bunker roof of the Lang Co raft. The raft continued to have leakage problems throughout October, and much work was done in an effort to solve that problem. Headquarters Company began rehabilitation of the perimeter road in Foxtrot sector of CAMP EAGLE on 19 October, and on 22 October, began resurfacing the auto-rotation strip at FS/08 BIRMINGHAM. Company C from 21 to 24 October, cleared 150 meters of an old antipersonnel mine field at FS/08 LOS BANOS, utilizing thirty-four cases of Bangalore torpedoes. On 22 October, Company A began rehabilitation of the Division Headquarters Company mess hall. Headquarters Company completed rebuilding the Hotel sector perimeter road on 23 October, and on 23 and 24 October, did additional work on the Huong Thuy road, on which work had been suspended in late September because of rain. After two days of fill haul, rain again caused work to cease on that civic action project. Company B, on 23 and 24 October, constructed a 10' x 24' bunker for MACV advisory personnel at the Huong Tra RF/PF compound. Throughout October, Company A continued the development of BIRMINGHAM, constructing bunkers and working on drainage problems. At the end of the month, Company A had completed 27 bunkers on that firebase. Company B continued support of FS/08s RAKHASAN and JACK, concentrating on drainage improvement and minor construction on bunkers and facilities. At JACK, Company B installed numerous culverts and placed over 500 cubic yards of rock on interior roads to improve the trafficability and drainage there. Company C continued bunker construction and firebase development at BRICK, ARSENAL, and TOMAHAWK, completing the mess bunker at TOMAHAWK. Minesweeping missions were continued on CAMP EAGLE access roads and on Route 547 between BIRMINGHAM and BASTOGNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Company B assumed responsibility for the minesweep of the road to RAKKASAN on 23 October and on 26 October, sustained casualties of one killed and two wounded in the performance of that mission. As the wet season set in, boat platoon supported daily operations over the entire area of operations. Base Camp construction and maintenance was performed by all lettered companies throughout October. Headquarters Company performed numerous small earth-moving tasks.

(4) The reporting period closed with the battalion continuing to provide general and direct support to the division and extensive emergency rescue and resupply for the Vietnamese during a severe flood. On 29 October, Headquarters and A Company commenced an around-the-clock debris-removing operation that saved the 616-foot Pohl bridge on Route 547. More than 5,000 pounds of explosive were used. Four boat rescue teams were dispatched during the flood. The first team, on 30 October, was airlifted to Phong Dien district and rescued 732 civilians and resupplied 3,000 more with critically needed food. The second team, on 30 October, moved overland to the Song Bo river and resupplied 3,200 civilians and two RF companies with rice and fish. The third team, on 31 October, rescued three persons and transported 300 pounds of rice to isolated civilians in Huong Thuy district. The last boat team was airlifted to Phu Tu district to provide resupply of stranded individuals.

### m. Air Cavalry Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry continued its role of providing reconnaissance and security and was targeted in areas of known or suspected enemy activity.

(2) The Squadron, in support of the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) during August, detected enemy movement and concentrations near FS/OB O'REILLY. This early warning of enemy activity and constant support for the ARVN during August and September around O'REILLY resulted in the eventual halt of the enemy advance. During September, the Squadron moved a forward command post to Da Nang and conducted extensive operations in the ELEPHANT VALLEY, searching for rear base areas of the 4th and 5th Independent Regiments/MRTTH. Poor weather during the last half of October restricted the Squadron's reconnaissance efforts.

### (3) Results of reconnaissance during the reporting period:

	August	September	October
Spot Reports	1,207	1,405	728
CSWC	6	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

	August	September	October
INC	2	3	1
KIA	61	57	57
POW	0	0	0

(4) During the quarter, Squadron medical assets have continued to be used to augment existing medical aid in Thua Thien Province. Nearly a thousand Vietnamese were treated in Squadron MEDCAPs. Three patients were taken to Hue Hospital for specialized treatment. The Squadron has set a goal of two MEDCAPs per week, thereby providing greater medical assistance to Vietnamese in District III. Currently, these MEDCAPs are established in the two villages which, according to the district chief, have the greatest need for assistance. The MEDCAPs provide not only medical assistance to the people but also medical training to the Vietnamese health workers. Each MEDCAP includes one Vietnamese health worker and a minimum of one nurse.

(5) The Squadron has a quota of 300,000 leaflets to be dropped each week to augment the leaflets dropped by the 9th SCS Support Company. Targets for the drops have been: trails, suspected base sites, areas of enemy contact, and airstrike targets.

(6) Ranger activities.

(a) Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry, under operational control of the 2d Squadron (Airmobile) 17th Cav provides division with the capability of conducting long range reconnaissance patrols, surveillance of enemy infiltration routes and prisoner of war snatch missions when tactically feasible.

(b) During the month of August, Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry employed Ranger teams in the vicinity of LEATHERNECK, ID 9331 and south of Camp EAGLE in the RUONG RUONG Valley, at IC 8090, and in the SPEAR area, near IC 7090. A total of 38 teams were deployed by the company during the month. Fourteen enemy sightings were made and contact was initiated on ten occasions. As a result of these contacts, two NVA/VC were killed. The company sustained three KIA and nine WIA.

(c) During September, Co L employed Ranger teams in the A Chau Valley in the vicinity of YD 0001, and the RUONG RUONG Valley area, near IC 8090. A total of 24 teams were deployed by the company during the month. Thirteen enemy sightings were made and contact was initiated

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSF02-65 (R2) (U)

by Ranger personnel on six occasions. As a result of these contacts, five NVA/VC were killed. The company sustained one KIA.

(d) Co L deployed a total of 24 teams during the month of October. Two teams were inserted in the vicinity of Bach Ma; four teams were inserted along route 547; and the remainder were inserted in or near the Khe Quan, Rao Trang and Song Bo river valleys. Ranger teams established contact with the enemy on five occasions and had visual sightings on eight occasions.

### n. Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry brigades with the 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty (105) in direct support of the 1st Bde; the 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty (105) in direct support of the 2d Bde; and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty (105) in direct support of the 3d Bde. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty (155) and the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) continued to provide general support artillery fires to the division. Additionally, Btry A, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) was general support reinforcing 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty; Btry B, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) was general support reinforcing 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty; and Btry C, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) was general support reinforcing 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty.

(2) The following 108th Artillery Group units provided heavy artillery support to allied forces in Northern Military Region 1. The 1st Bn (8"/175mm SP), 39th Arty, general support reinforcing 1st Inf Div Arty (ARVN); 1st Bn (8"/175mm SP), 83d Arty, general support reinforcing 101st Abn Div Arty (Ambl); 2d Bn (8"/175mm SP), 94th Arty, general support reinforcing 5th Bn (155 SP), 4th Arty.

(3) Btry D, 1st Bn (AW, SP), 44th Arty, Btry G (AW), 65th Arty, and Btry G (SLT), 29th Arty, whose parent units are general support to XXIV Corps, were deployed in Northern Military Region 1 to provide support for base and bridge security.

(4) Artillery fires were employed throughout the division area of operation in response to sensor activations, radar detections, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. Artillery support for ARVN/GVN forces was provided through direct coordination between collocated ARVN and US artillery fire direction centers or through liaison officers or US advisors with ARVN/GVN forces. US and ARVN artillery units continued to employ coordinated fires in support of combined operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(5) During the reporting period, the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambi) played an increasingly important part in the support of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN). The number of contact fire missions flown in support of ARVN units greatly outweighed the number flown in support of US forces. A close and effective liaison effort between the battalion and the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) produced commendable results. Through classes and experiences, Aerial Rocket Artillery sections have maintained a ratio of one enemy killed per 16 rockets expended in support of ARVN units.

(6) During the northeast monsoon season, emphasis is placed on taking advantage of all division aircraft assets to maintain visual reconnaissance in the division AO. In expectation of receiving an increase of visual reconnaissance missions, Battery A (Aviation), 377th Artillery (Ambi) commenced an extensive training program in early August. Pilots are trained by experienced aviators who are fully qualified in low level flight with the OH-6A aircraft. Individuals must volunteer for these missions prior to starting the training program. This training is thorough and has proven successful in that Btry A has not experienced any accidents during low level visual reconnaissance missions.

### o. Information

#### (1) Public Information

(a) Number of hometown news releases: 3,004

(b) Number of news/feature stories released to public and military media: 193

(c) Number of photographs released: 235

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 68

(e) Coverage was also provided for 26 distinguished visitors to the division, including Mr. Robert Johnson, assistant secretary of the Army, and Pam Eldred, Miss America, 1970.

#### (2) Command Information

(a) During the reporting period, seven issues of the division newspaper, "The Screaming Eagle", and the summer issue of the division magazine, " rendezvous with Destiny", were published.

(b) A special issue of the "Airborne Dateline" was published on 8 October on President Nixon's address to the nation on Southeast Asia.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Two command information fact sheets entitled "You and VD" and "Drug Abuse" were printed and distributed to division personnel.

(d) Two taped reports were released for use of AFVN by the division's radio broadcast section.

### 2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Intelligence.

(1) Use of sensors during periods of bad weather.

(a) Observation: Unattended ground sensors are of greatly increased importance as intelligence sources during periods of bad weather.

(b) Evaluation: During periods of poor visibility or severe storm conditions, available methods of surveillance become limited. Unattended ground sensors are only slightly affected by adverse weather conditions - an increase in false activations caused by a higher ambient noise level. This slight increase in false activations can be offset by training.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders consider the value of unattended ground sensors during periods of bad weather.

(2) Use of aerial photographs for briefing Ranger teams.

(a) Observation: Aerial photographs greatly enhance the planning and orientation of individual team members prior to operations.

(b) Evaluation: During the planning phase of ranger team operations, the team leader and his assistant normally are afforded the opportunity to make an aerial reconnaissance. The remaining team members must rely solely on the memory of the team leader and/or his assistant for terrain orientation. The use of aerial photographs of the operational area during the mission briefing to familiarize each team member with terrain, vegetation, landing zones and pick-up zones, has proven to be a valuable assistance to Ranger teams.

(c) Recommendation: Ranger units consider using aerial photographs for planning and orienting team members.

(3) Traditional AO boundaries provide the enemy sanctuaries.



## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: The enemy sets up base camps along traditional boundary lines.

(b) Evaluation: For well over a year, the 13 grid line has been the traditional northern boundary line between the 1st Bde and the 3d ARVN Regt. When any reconnaissance or offensives were initiated into this area, the enemy would simply move across the boundary line, thus occupying what amounted to a sanctuary. A coordinated offensive by the 1st Bde and the 3d ARVN Regt into this area resulted in 53 NVA/VC KIA and 38 IWC. All indications show that elements of the 810th Bn have operated in the sanctuary for at least two years.

(c) Recommendation: Units should exercise a more coordinated and manual surveillance of their AO boundaries.

(4) Enemy returning to base camps.

(a) Observation: The enemy reuses his old base camps.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases, the enemy constantly utilizes the same base camps along a known route of travel. In the area north of FSB BASTOGNE, elements of the 810th Bn operated for over two years. An element of 1/327 Inf was reconnoitering an old base camp when the enemy, unknowingly, revisited the same base camp. The encounter resulted in a POW and miscellaneous documents.

(c) Recommendations: Set up a systematic plan for the ambush and reconnaissance of known enemy base camps.

(5) Liaison with indigenous woodcutters.

(a) Observation: Woodcutters can be excellent sources of intelligence.

(b) Evaluation: Since woodcutters travel into the canopy to extract their products, there is a good chance they are approached by NVA/VC. There should be some installation or opportunity for these woodcutters to report such engagements. An excellent example is the 1st Bde aid station. It is located next to the woodcutter checkpoint, and is open to all woodcutters for the treatment of minor wounds. An interpreter and medic are always present.

(c) Recommendation: Maintain and expand facilities which increase contacts with woodcutters.

(6) Pinpointing weather information.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: Valuable blade time may be lost due to a lack of specific weather information around individual FS/OBs. During periods of marginal weather, attempts to resupply FS/OBs have been aborted after arrival of the aircraft over the FS/OB. Conversely, resupply sorties have been cancelled prior to take off during periods of marginal weather when conditions at a particular FS/OB were acceptable.

(b) Evaluation: Pinpointing weather information can readily assist the planning and conduct of airmobile resupply operations. Pathfinders are located on FS/OBs to provide aircraft traffic control and are trained to provide area weather information. Requiring Pathfinders to provide hourly weather information during periods of marginal weather has improved the utilization of blade time.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders consider adopting this program during periods of marginal weather.

### c. Operations.

(1) Expedient calibration for Radar Course Directing Control, AN/TPQ 10A.

(a) Observation: The USMC Air Support Radar Team (ASRT) located at FS/OB BIRMINGHAM is required to calibrate the Radar Course Directing Central, AN/TPQ 10A monthly and as required due to specific maintenance or repair operations. The specified calibration procedure requires that an air or ground observer spot the strike of the bomb against a predetermined prominent terrain feature. Inclement weather conditions severely restrict observed calibration and has resulted in the AN/TPQ 10A RADAR being considered nonoperational even though the equipment is correct mechanically.

(b) Evaluation: In order to conduct calibration while maintaining an adequate troop safety margin, the G3 Air arranged for calibration of the AN/TPQ RADAR using a Radar Set, AN/MPQ 4 to determine bomb strike locations and a second air tracking radar (USAF AN/MSQ 77 or USMC AN/TPQ 10A) to verify the attack aircraft in-flight characteristics. When a flight of two attack aircraft is available, the use of a second air tracking radar is not necessary. Calibration using the above controls in an adverse weather environment resulted in Circular Error Probable (CEP) accuracies of 20 meters and 25 meters on successive calibration runs. These CEP's were within the required 50 meters CEP and were accepted by Marine Air Support Squadron 3 as being adequate. Use of this alternate calibration procedure resulted in having the ASRT operational a minimum of two days earlier than could have been obtained by waiting for suitable weather conditions.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (E2) (U)

Additionally, an ASRT adverse weather calibration procedure has been established and is expected to prove highly beneficial during the north-east monsoon.

(c) Recommendation: That units supported by USMC Air Support Radar Team adopt this alternate calibration system when inclement weather conditions restrict observed calibration.

(2) Use of peneprime "road mix" as an expedient surfacing technique.

(a) Observation: Secondary roads in MR 1 utilize laterite soil for subgrade, base courses, and surfacing. An expedient means of dust control in the summer, and waterproofing in the winter is the application of a surface coating of peneprime. This surface coating of peneprime is satisfactory during the dry season but erodes quickly during the frequent torrential rains in the wet season.

(b) Evaluation: Once the peneprimed surfacing erodes, the action of water and heavy truck tires quickly breaks through to the base courses, and in time, to the subgrade. Roads to firebases were impassable for several months (November, December, and January) last year because of this. In an attempt to rectify this situation, employing available equipment and material, a superior field expedient surfacing technique was developed. The road surface is first scarified to a depth of four to six inches. The first application of peneprime is a 50/50 peneprime/JF4 mixture. After this is thoroughly windrowed, a second mixture is then applied 70/30, and windrowed. This is followed by two more 70/30 applications. This mixture is then graded and compacted. The final step is two applications of a conventional surface coating of peneprime. Depending on the temperature and humidity, the road is trafficable in 1-3 days. This method provides both the dust-inhibiting characteristic of the conventional peneprimed surface plus an impermeable wearing course.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider adopting the expedient surfacing technique stated above.

(3) Use of Soil-cement Sandbags in Drainage Systems.

(a) Observation: A substitute for culvert was found to be necessary because of the high price of the culvert and the difficulty in its procurement.

(b) Evaluation: In lining open drainage ditches, soil-cement sandbags were found to be an adequate substitute for culvert sections.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

When the sandbags are properly mixed and shaped, they form a solidified lining that satisfactorily prevents excessive accumulation of mud in the ditches.

(c) Recommendation: That soil-cement sandbags be used in lining ditches when standard culvert is not available. This results in conservation of materials and avoids the delay encountered in requesting materials through supply channels. Another appropriate use for the soil-cement sandbags would be in the construction of culvert headwalls where ordinary sandbags require greater stability.

### (4) Rapid engagement of radar acquired targets.

(a) Observation: Enemy targets acquired by the TFS-25 radar must be engaged rapidly by artillery for fires to be effective.

(b) Evaluation: Several measures can be taken to expedite processing calls for artillery fires to engage these targets. Radar spottings recorded over a period of several months have revealed patterns of enemy activity. Many spottings have concentrated in a relatively small number of grid squares. These grid squares are precleared daily. Permanent air warning data to the center of mass of the precleared grids have been posted with the AWCC station. When a radar spotting is received the AWCC station is requested to post the air hazard, and the target is fired.

(c) Recommendation: That the procedures discussed above be used for engagement of radar acquired targets.

### (5) Ladder Roll-outs

(a) Observation: In August 1970, Ranger team Japan II executed a roll-out exchange with team Japan I. Three hours after the insertion, team Japan II made contact. A roll-out is accomplished when a helicopter enters a landing zone and one team exits the aircraft from one door while the ground team boards the aircraft through the other door. If this is accomplished in a touch down LZ in less than 15 seconds, the method is acceptable. When using ladders for roll-out, one team climbs down one ladder while the other team ascends the other ladder. To execute the ladder roll-out of Ranger team Japan II, the aircraft hovered in the LZ for seven minutes.

(b) Evaluation: Seven minutes in a LZ is too long for any operation. The theory of using a roll-out is sound when executed properly. Ladder extractions necessitate that the aircraft hover in one position

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

for a prolonged period of time allowing the enemy to determine the location of the ground elements.

(c) Recommendation: Roll-outs should only be conducted when a ground element has a confirmed touch down LZ. This minimizes the time the aircraft is actually in the landing zone and enables a faster exchange of ranger teams.

(6) Counter mortar target engagement using direct fire.

(a) Observation: Possible enemy mortar positions must be plotted and fired prior to darkness on the first day of occupation on a new firebase.

(b) Evaluation: When a howitzer Btry occupied FSB BLITZ, several possible enemy mortar locations were plotted and fired using direct fire on the high ground to the west of the firebase. This was accomplished prior to nightfall on the first day of occupation. When the firebase came under indirect fire attack three nights later, the battery immediately engaged the preplanned targets with direct fire, silencing the mortar and causing a secondary explosion.

(c) Recommendation: Employ direct fire on possible enemy mortar locations prior to darkness and give specific assignments to each gun section on action to be taken if the firebase comes under attack. When rounds begin to fall on firebase all sections engage assigned targets with 10-15 rounds and then submit further instructions to expand on known enemy locations.

(7) Carrying 17-pound rockets on inboard wing of AH1G aircraft.

(a) Observation: A modification in the manner in which 17-pound, HE warhead, 2.75 inch, Folding Fin Aerial Rockets are carried on AH1G aircraft equipped with four 159C rocket pods has increased the possibilities of reducing major damage to aircraft during emergency conditions.

(b) Evaluation: The 17-pound warhead rockets are loaded in the inboard wings only, while lighter munitions are carried in the outboard stores. The heavier inboard wing stores can be jettisoned during engine failures or other emergency conditions and the lighter outboard stores can be retained for stability and assistance in maintaining an upright attitude, once ground contact is made.

(c) Recommendation: Aerial Artillery units consider the use of the

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, MCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

above stated method of carrying rocket munitions.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training. None.

f. Logistics. Care of equipment during the rainy season.

(a) Observation: The northeast monsoon creates special problems in the care of equipment. In the past, existing drying facilities have not been adequate to handle the necessary large quantity of wet and soiled equipment.

(b) Evaluation: Preparation for erection and establishment of drying facilities for items of equipment being retrograded during the rainy season poses a major problem. The utilization of drying tents or other suitable facilities have not been considered adequate to supplement the existing laundry facilities during the influx of wet equipment from field locations.

(c) Recommendation: Units consider the amount of tentage or building space required to satisfy their particular needs. Periodically, as units return from the field for a short stand down, their equipment is placed in the drying facility to prevent mildew and other damage from moisture. These facilities should be available in forward and rear positions. The construction of field expedient heating devices from 55 gallon drums cut in half and properly ventilated will provide a suitable heat source. Diesel fuel is used in conjunction with discarded paper products which are not otherwise usable for construction material. Despite the distasteful odor, the equipment can be dried. Fire burning material should be kept outside the tent; a stove pipe should be run through the structure to provide radiant heat. If available, a fan should be used for circulation.

g. Communications. None

h. Material.

(1) Engine Failure.

(a) Observation: Five of the 10 accidents experienced during the reporting period were a direct result of engine failure over unsuitable forced landing areas.

(b) Evaluation: Preliminary analysis of the engine failures indicates 4th stage compressor failures and foreign object damage are the primary causes.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: In view of the unsuitable terrain in MR 1, it is essential that positive steps be taken to eliminate in-flight engine failures. A combination of proper fuel handling procedures, aircraft spectrometric oil analysis, turbine engine analysis, daily engine recording Jet-cal analyzer and go-no-go checks will prevent many possible fuel starvation failures if properly employed and monitored.

(2) Excessive non-available time on engineer equipment due to flat tires.

(a) Observation: Graders, scoop loaders, tractors, and backhoes have continued to be deadlined from six to 24 hours because of flat tires at job sites. Normally, when one of these critical pieces of equipment becomes inoperative, other equipment also ceases to work.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that when an item of engineer equipment has a flat tire, it requires between six and twenty-four hours to dismount, backhaul, repair, return, and remount. Normally, engineer equipment will perform only one operation (i.e. loading, dozing), and is dependent on other equipment to complete a mission. Hence, when one piece is deadlined, other equipment must cease work. Normally, wheeled engineer equipment does not come from the factory with spare wheels and tires as does ordnance equipment. Consequently, each time a flat occurs, that tire must be repaired and returned. Spare wheels can be ordered through normal supply channels. It is feasible to maintain spare tires for this equipment in the rear area or to mount the spares on the equipment. Either method saves time.

(c) Recommendation: Sufficient spare wheels and tires for organic engineer equipment should be procured through supply channels. These spares can then be utilized in the same manner as spare tires on ordnance vehicles.

i. Other.

(1) Portable flame throwers used to fight fires.

(a) Observation: During the summer months several large fires created by enemy activity destroyed property on forward fire bases which were inaccessible to effective fire fighting equipment.

(b) Evaluation: A search for portable equipment resulted in tests of the portable flame thrower filled with "Lite Water," FSN 4210-935-1616. Lite Water is a concentrated foaming agent which produces blanketing foam when mixed with water and sprayed under pressure. Normally, one pressurized tank will employ two loads of lite water.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Once this employment technique was developed, a message was dispatched directing commanders to establish a fire point on each occupied firebase which included two portable flamethrowers. These portable flame throwers, M2A1 or M9-7, and a premixed 55-gallon drum of lite water, are now required to be maintained for fighting fires. It was found that the pressure regulator on the M2A1 should be adjusted to an operating pressure of 150psi. The M9-7 pressure regulator cannot be adjusted. This fire fighting expedient has already been credited with saving a mess hall and an ammunition dump.

(c) Recommendation: This fire fighting expedient be adopted by other units.

### (2) Medicine for MEDCAPS.

(a) Observation: Despite the generally good quality of supplies and the performance of interpreters, there has been a lack of understanding by the Vietnamese patients as to the use of medicines, and therefore a failure of US Medcap assistance to meet its full potential.

(b) Evaluation: The best medicine does no good if the patient does not know what to do with it. In fact, it could prove extremely harmful.

(c) Recommendation: To help bridge the gap of understanding, medicine labels should be translated into Vietnamese. This will greatly assist Vietnamese health workers, and help preclude the misuse of drugs by the villagers.

### (3) MEDCAP Utilization.

(a) Observation: Improper utilization of MEDCAP, Phase II, is detrimental to the psychological effect of the program.

(b) Evaluation: MEDCAP, Phase II, is for the purpose of training Vietnamese medical personnel. After 6-8 MEDCAPs the Vietnamese health workers with proper training become sufficiently proficient to conduct these activities. However, when only a small number of Vietnamese can be treated because training is being conducted, an unfavorable impression is conveyed to those not treated.

(c) Recommendation: The surgeon with the MEDCAP team should choose 10 to 15 personnel with more serious medical problems for treatment. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese village health workers already trained should treat the minor ailments under the guidance of the team medic. Thus, maximum treatment and training benefit is derived from the mission.

### (4) Aerial Broadcast System in Lowlands:

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(a) Observation: The most effective altitude for broadcasting in the lowlands is 600-900 feet.

(b) Evaluation: Currently, the minimum altitude for aerial broadcast is 1200-1500 feet. During test flights at various altitudes, observation showed that the best responses were obtained at an altitude of 600-900 feet. Phase responses consisted of people stopping their work to look up and listen. Prior to these tests their responses could not be noted.

(c) Recommendation: The existing altitude restriction placed on PSYOPS aircraft operating over the lowlands should be lowered to 600-900 feet when the tactical situation permits.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (B2) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 5 DEC 1970

TO: Commanding General, USARV, APO 96375

1. (U) The ORLL for 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), has been reviewed by this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15.

2. (C) This headquarters concurs with the report as written with the following comments:

a. Reference item concerning "G2 Air Operations," paragraph 1d(3), page 19: concur. Although the major cause of non-completed missions was bad weather, aircraft and sensor malfunctions were also contributing factors, particularly affecting the infrared capability.

b. Reference item concerning "Use of sensors in bad weather," paragraph 2b(1), page 50: concur. Unattended ground sensors are one of the primary sources of surveillance of enemy activities and movements during inclement weather and when other more conventional sources of surveillance are not practicable. Recently during the worst flooding in six years it was expected that sensor "drown outs" would be approximately twenty-five percent of the total strings in Corps AO. After the floods receded an evaluation of the strings revealed only minor disruptions in activations of the strings which had been affected by the rains, winds, and floods. During the periods of extremely heavy rain fall and high winds there was a noticeable increase in sensor activations, however competent readout operators detected these activations as weather induced. It was determined that although wind and rain caused an increase in activations, it did not affect the overall operation of most of the devices.

c. Reference item concerning "Use of aerial photographs for briefing Ranger teams," paragraph 2b(2) page 50: concur. However, aerial photography should be used judiciously by commanders for such purposes as it does not lend itself to proper interpretation by untrained personnel. It is recommended that personnel trained in imagery interpretation be present when aerial photography is being used for such purposes.

d. Reference item concerning "Traditional AO boundaries provide the enemy sanctuaries," paragraph 2b(3), page 50: concur. As an alternate solution, if coordinated operations cannot be affected, temporary AO extensions should be established to allow ground elements to pursue the enemy across traditional AO boundaries.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-OCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

e. Reference item concerning "Expedient calibration for Radar Course Directing Control, AN/TPQ 10A," paragraph 2c(1), page 52: nonconcur. Although the ASRT located at FSB Birmingham was tested and found to be within prescribed limits by use of a second radar set and in conjunction with AN/TPQ-4 in lieu of visual spotting of the marking rounds, this method is still in the evaluation phase and is presently the subject of a Marine Corps staff study along with a study of other proposed procedures for poor weather calibration of the AN/TPQ-10. When this evaluation is completed and approved by higher authority, information concerning the evaluation will be disseminated through proper Marine Corps channels. The unit will be so advised.

f. Reference item concerning "Use of penoprime "road mix" as an expedient surfacing technique," paragraph 2c(2), page 53: nonconcur. Penoprime is a light dust palliative, not suitable for preparing a wearing surface. This expedient should only be used when suitable cutback or emulsified asphalt are unavailable. The same amount of work with the proper materials will give a better product.

g. Reference item concerning "Use of Soil-cement Sandbags in Drainage Systems," paragraph 2c(3), page 53: concur. This is a technique that has been used by many engineer units, when cement is available and more permanent structural stability is required. Caution should be used in recommending an expedient method simply as a means to circumvent delays in supply procedures. Substitutions decrease demand data, and a false usage factor develops.

h. Reference item concerning "Ladder Roll-outs," paragraph 2c(5), page 54: concur. The ladder roll-out technique is not tactically sound when it requires the aircraft to hover for a long period of time, and increase its vulnerability to enemy fire.

i. Reference item concerning "Counter mortar target engagement using direct fire," paragraph 2c(6), page 55: concur. All possible enemy mortar positions should be plotted and, if possible, fired using direct or indirect fire depending upon which technique is the most efficient means of engaging the target. These locations (having been fired in) serve as preplanned targets in the units counter mortar program. The employment of other crew served weapons should also be considered.

j. Reference item concerning "Engine Failure," paragraph 2h(1), page 56: concur. However, the phrase "will prevent many possible fuel starvation failures if properly employed and monitored," should be changed to read, "will doubtless preclude many engine failures." The use

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

AVII-CCT (15 Nov 70) 1st ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

of programs such as spectrometric oil analysis, jet - cal analyzer and turbine engine performance analysis thru comparison of daily engine recordings would have no effect on engine failures due to fuel starvation. Additionally, many engine failure accidents are not necessarily the direct result of the engine failure, but rather can be the result of how the emergency is handled by the operator, and the environment the aircraft is operating in when the emergency occurs. The incidence of aircraft damage in forced landings can be greatly reduced through a program of operator education in correct operating practices. Such a program is recommended by the US Army Board for Aviation Accident Research as the primary tool in a unit accident prevention program; therefore recommend that emphasis on proper operating practices be added to the recommendation in the ORLL.

k. Reference item concerning "Excessive non-available time on engineer equipment due to flat tires," paragraph 2h(2), page 57: concur. Engineer equipment is frequently employed in areas where excessive tire abuse is normal. Spare wheels ordered through normal supply channels and tires maintained in the units PLL should be assembled to provide no more than one complete spare per piece of equipment.

l. Reference item concerning "Aerial Broadcast System in Lowlands," paragraph 2i(4), page 58: nonconcur.

(1) PSYOP aerial broadcast assets should be utilized to achieve maximum results; however, the recommended altitude of 600-900 feet places the aircraft in the "Dead Man Zone". The 101st Airborne Division's restriction of 1200 to 1500 feet minimum altitude for PSYOPS aircraft is based on the vulnerability of the aircraft to small arms fire. Flights below 1200 feet should be attempted only after a thorough consideration of the risks involved and the expected results to be obtained. The division level aerial broadcast systems should be improved to allow them to be effective at a higher altitude.

(2) The Corps PSYOP broadcasting system, AEM-DE-1492C3 and the SA-1800C, are both restricted by regulations to operate above 1500 feet

## CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVII-GCT (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division  
(Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, BCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

altitude. Both systems have an optimum broadcast altitude of 4,000 feet,  
based on system capabilities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W. H. SMITH  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:  
CG, 101st Abn Div (Abnl) APO 96383

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVHDO-DO (15 Nov 70) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne  
Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 10 FEB 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Use of Penaprim 'Road Mix' as an Expedient Surfacing Technique," page 53, paragraph 2c(2) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2f: nonconcur with the use of JPl as a cutback due to low flash point. The method to be used is described in Section III of TM 5-335. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Carrying 17 pound Rockets on Inboard Wing of AH-1G Aircraft," page 55, paragraph 2c(7): concur. The maximum weight limit for the outboard wing stores is 550 pounds. The XM-200 and the XM-159C pod weigh 528 and 542 pounds respectively; therefore, both are within limits. Some AH-1 helicopter units in RVN carry these stores IAW established unit policy only inboard with the lighter stores outboard. In an emergency these stores are not jettisoned unless dictated otherwise, i.e., fire or hinders autorotation, but are retained so that on touchdown the outboard stores stabilize the helicopter and prevent it rolling on its side. This procedure is widely practiced but it is contrary to instruction contained in TM 55-1520-221-10. Recommend that DA provide additional guidance on carrying/jettison of external stores to the USAAVNS and new equipment training teams (NETT) for the AH-1 helicopters. Unit has been so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "Engine Failure," page 56, paragraph 2h(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j: concur with 1st Indorsement. Additionally the T53-L13B engine is now being used as replacements for the T53-L13A engine. The L-13B engine has an improved compressor section

AVHDO-DC (15 Nov 70) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne  
Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

which should preclude the disc failures that have been experienced with  
the L-13A engine. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit  
has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.

Captain AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
XXIV Corps  
101st Abn Div (Airmobile)


GPOP-DT (15 Nov 70) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for  
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 MAR 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
D.D. CLINE  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG



## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

1. (C) On 25 July, the 1st Brigade, in operational coordination with the 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN), initiated Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363. This operation continued into the reporting period.

2. (C) 1-12 August 1970

a. On 3 August, the 1st Bde assumed responsibility for FS/OB BASTOGNE from the 2d Bde, and the 3d Bn (-) (Ambl), 187th Inf moved from BASTOGNE to CAMP EVANS to increase patrol, surveillance and ambush operations south of the camp. Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and the Reconnaissance Platoon moved by air to secure FS/OB BASTOGNE and begin local patrol and surveillance operations. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf air assaulted from FS/OB RAKKASAN and the SWORD area into three landing zones southwest of FS/OB GLADIATOR. This assault was conducted in response to intelligence indications of a possible enemy attack against the firebase.

On 5 August, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf extracted from the GLADIATOR area and moved by air to CAMP EVANS to prepare for an assault into the vicinity of LIXICO on 6 August.

The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, having completed battalion refresher training, moved by vehicle, on 6 August, to FS/OBs BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to secure those firebases and conduct local patrol operations. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to operational control of the 2d Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf terminated operations, vicinity BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL, and moved to PHU BAI Combat Base to begin battalion refresher training and assume the mission of the division ready force.

The Hac Bao Company and Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav air assaulted to a landing zone at YD062197, 10 kilometers west of RANGER, to conduct combined search operations in a large bunker complex observed on 5 August. All elements were extracted late in the afternoon.

On 8 August, in response to intelligence indications of an enemy build-up in the FS/OB O'REILLY area, the 1st Regt (ARVN) moved its Reconnaissance Company to augment the security of the firebase. The 3d Battalion moved to landing zones northwest, northeast and west of the firebase and conducted search and attack operations in an attempt to gain contact with the enemy.

On 9 August, while conducting armed aerial reconnaissance in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN),

## CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

elements of Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav reported sighting 200 NVA on a ridge line, in the vicinity of YD299258-YD300240. In response to this sighting, 26 tactical air strikes, for 52 sorties, were flown in the area. In addition, 36 sorties of aerial rocket artillery were expended in the target area. Sky Spot missions continued throughout the night.

On 10 August, the 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) air assaulted from the FS/OB BARNETT area to a landing zone two kilometers northwest of O'REILLY to begin reconnaissance in force operations, moving south. Throughout the day, 14 forward air controlled missions were employed against known enemy locations in the O'REILLY area.

On 12 August, Operation CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363 was terminated and all units engaged in the operation began preparations for redeployment. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) moved to CAMP SALLY and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, minus Co C, moved from FS/OB MAUREEN and vicinity to CAMP EAGLE and prepared for movement to FS/OB BARNETT.

Cumulative results of the operation were 97 enemy killed (15 by US/82 by ARVN), 18 individual weapons captured (ARVN), and 14 crew served weapons captured (eight by US, six by ARVN). Three ARVN soldiers were killed in action and 43 were wounded in action. US casualties were two soldiers with minor wounds.

b. Significant Activities. On 1 August, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) killed 10 enemy in two engagements near ERSKINE and GRANITE. At 1600 hours, the 1st and 2d Companies, 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon with small arms fire three kilometers north of GOODMAN, killing 12 enemy and recovering two RPG Launchers, one AK-47, five CHICOM claymore mines, 27 RPG rounds, 110 82mm mortar rounds and miscellaneous documents. One ARVN soldier was killed and 15 were wounded.

At 021315 August, the 2d Co, 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force with small arms fire 50 meters from their position at YD156333 (MIAMI). A search of the contact area revealed 15 NVA KIA, one 60mm mortar (complete) and 150 60mm mortar rounds. Five ARVN soldiers were wounded in the action.

PHU BAI Combat Base was attacked by fire twice on 2 August. Four 122mm rockets were received at 2006 hours and two rockets at 2303 hours. No casualties or damage were caused. Artillery was

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

employed on a suspected enemy location at YD847063, southwest of the Camp.

CAMP EVANS received seven 122mm rockets at 031256 August, resulting in two US WIA; there were no other damages. Also on 3 August, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed seven enemy and recovered four individual weapons, near AIRBORNE.

On 5 August, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, in scattered contact, killed 11 enemy and destroyed five 12.7mm machine guns. On 6 August, air cavalry elements destroyed four and captured two additional 12.7mm machine guns.

On 6 August, two platoons of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the Mac Bao Company were inserted in the vicinity of YD056197, seven and one half kilometers west of RANGER, to conduct a ground BDA of an ARC LIGHT strike. The Mac Bao Company discovered 67 bunkers, 300 RPG rounds, 600 pounds of CL, 500 NVA uniforms, 50 boxes of medical supplies, 36 cases of AK-47 rounds, 100 82mm mortar rounds, 15 ruck-sacks and 25 pounds of miscellaneous documents.

Elements of the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed seven enemy 1500 meters north of PS/OB O'REILLY on 6 August. The firebase received 82mm mortars at 1715 hours, resulting in one ARVN soldier KIA and one WIA.

Also on 6 August, at 1819 hours, HUE CITY received four 122mm rockets, which impacted in the ARVN detention center. One billet was destroyed, 14 detainees were killed and 89 were wounded.

At 0645 hours on 9 August, the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received eighty 82mm mortar rounds impacting on and around their position, two kilometers west of PS/OB O'REILLY. There were no casualties. At 1115 hours, the CP, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), on PS/OB O'REILLY, received 82mm mortar fire resulting in one ARVN soldier KIA and 13 WIA. During the night, the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed 12 enemy two and one half kilometers west of the firebase, and suffered two KIA.

In the area of CHISAGO PEAK/LAM SON 363 operations, the 1st and 2d Bns, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed 11 enemy near AIRBORNE.

On 10 August, a total of 36 enemy were killed in the vicinity of PS/OB O'REILLY by elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN), supported by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. Eight ARVN soldiers were wounded in action during the day, as the enemy made extensive use of 82mm mortars.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

The firebase received two 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and six 82mm mortar rounds, which caused no casualties or damage.

On 11 and 12 August, a total of 112 enemy were killed in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. Elements of the 1st and 4th Bns, 1st Regt (ARVN) accounted for 19 enemy killed. The 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav killed 23, and tactical air strikes and ARA killed 70. One ARVN soldier was killed and 11 wounded during the two days of contact.

### 3. (C) 13-25 August 1970.

a. On 13 August, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf passed from the operational control of the 1st Bde to the 3d Bde and moved from CAMP EAGLE to FS/OB BARNETT and vicinity. The mission of the battalion was to secure the firebase and conduct search and attack patrols in the area. This move released the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) to assault from BARNETT to an LZ five kilometers west of FS/OB O'REILLY, and begin reconnaissance in force operations, moving to the west.

FS/OB MAUREEN was closed at 141525 August.

On 15 August, the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) extracted from the O'REILLY area and moved to LA VANG to prepare for future operations.

On 16 August, while conducting EDA, the Mac Bao Company discovered a large medical cache at YD168210, four kilometers north-east of RANGER. To assist in exploiting this discovery, three platoons of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav were inserted. All elements were extracted on 17 August.

On 18 August, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved by air and vehicle from FS/OB VEGHEL and BASTOGNE to CAMP EAGLE to prepare for refresher training and assume the DRF mission. The 1st Bde assumed OPCON of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf from the 2d Bde and the battalion moved by air to VEGHEL and BASTOGNE. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf completed refresher training and began patrol and ambush operations to the south and southwest of CAMP EVANS.

On 23 August, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf completed battalion refresher training and, on 24 August, returned to FS/OB VEGHEL and BASTOGNE. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf returned to operational control of the 2d Bde and moved to PHU LOC District to secure FS/OB LOS BANOS and TOMAHAWK. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved from PHU LOC District to CAMP EAGLE to begin battalion refresher training and assume the DRF mission.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Also on 24 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, which had been detached from the division since early 1968, began arriving at PHU BAI Combat Base. The battalion, with attached artillery and engineer support, most recently had been employed in the AN KHE area.

b. Significant Activities. Shortly after insertion into the FS/OB BARNETT area on 13 August, the 3d Plt, Co A and the Recon Plt, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf made contact with enemy forces resulting in six NVA KIA, one US soldier killed and three wounded.

At 151145 August, two kilometers southeast of FS/OB O'REILLY, the light CP, and 2d and 3d Cos, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received 82mm mortars, RPG and small arms fire from a company size enemy force. The elements returned organic weapons fire and were supported by aircraft from the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl). A search of the contact area revealed 15 NVA KIA and three CSWC. ARVN casualties were two soldiers KIA and 16 WIA.

On the night of 15-16 August, at YD 171319, three kilometers west-southwest of FS/OB BARNETT, the 2d and 3d Platoons of Co B and the 3d Platoon, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, while in their NDP, engaged in a night long battle with an estimated company size enemy force. A first light search of the area, on 16 August, revealed 34 additional enemy killed in the contact area, a large number of bunkers and significant amounts of enemy equipment and supplies.

Also on 16 August, a ground EDA by elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the Mac Bao Company, four kilometers northeast of RANGER, resulted in the discovery of 12 bunkers, eight huts, 60 NVA uniforms, 14 medical kits, seven sets of medical instruments, 2640 pounds of rice, 100 122mm rockets, and miscellaneous documents. Additionally, elements of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) killed 27 enemy in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. Four ARVN were killed and seven were wounded.

On 180445 August, at YD 193273, vicinity JEROME, the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy battalion surrounding their position. The ARVN elements returned organic weapons fire, resulting in 38 NVA KIA and one PW captured. Thirteen ARVN soldiers were wounded in the action.

An estimated company size enemy force reoccupied a bunker complex at YD 171319, a location which had been used as an NDP by elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, supported by helicopter gunships, ARA, artillery and air strikes, assaulted the position at 0900 hours and secured the hill mass at 1330 hours. Twenty-five

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

enemy were killed in the assault. The company suffered one killed and eight wounded.

On 22 August, three kilometers northwest of RIPCORN, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered 20 enemy killed the previous day by tactical air strikes.

On 23 August, elements of the 2d and 4th Bns, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed 34 enemy in the O'REILLY area. Enemy losses included 250 one-half pound satchel charges, 100 82mm mortar rounds, and five crew served weapons. ARVN casualties were two KIA and nine MIA.

During the period 13-25 August, 290 enemy were killed in combined operations by elements of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 3d Bde in the O'REILLY/BARNETT/JEROME area. Six US and 21 ARVN soldiers were killed in action during the period.

4. (C) 26 August - 5 September 1970.

a. During this period, in anticipation of the northeast monsoon, the division began to reposition and realign units in preparation for Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70.

On 26 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed movement from AN KHE, RVN and the 2d Bde assumed operational control of the Battalion.

Also on 26 August, the 3d Bde CP at CAMP EVANS assumed operational control of the 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in districts in the division AO which are north of the Perfume River. With this change, the 3d Bde assumed a share of the responsibilities for pacification, development, and MTFs in the populated lowlands from the 2d Bde.

On 28 August, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed from the operational control of the 1st Bde to the 3d Bde. Co D secured FS/OB MAUREEN during the insertion of Btry C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty which conducted an artillery raid. In conjunction with the artillery raid, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf closed FS/OB GLADIATOR at 1945 hours. The battalion continued to conduct search and attack patrols in the RANKASAN/GLADIATOR area.

On 29 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf combat assaulted to BRICK and vicinity to secure the firebase and conduct search and attack operations. Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty closed the firebase at 1515 hours.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR665 (R2) (U)

On 30 August, the division continued realignment of forces and responsibilities in preparation for the northeast monsoon by repositioning maneuver battalions and passing responsibility for FS/OB BIRMINGHAM from the 2d Bde to the 1st Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to the 1st Bde. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from the MEXICO/GLADIATOR area to FS/OB BIRMINGHAM to secure the firebase and conduct local patrol operations. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf terminated operations in coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN) at FS/OB BARNETT, and moved to CAMP EAGLE to begin battalion refresher training. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf assaulted from PHU LOC District into the GLADIATOR/MEXICO/GRANITE area, and passed from the operational control of the 2d Bde to the 3d Bde. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf completed battalion refresher training and redeployed to PHU LOC District. The battalion CP moved to FS/OB TOMAHAWK.

On 31 August, the 3d Bde closed FS/OB KATHRYN and MAUREEN. Btry C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty terminated the artillery raid at FS/OB MAUREEN and moved to CAMP EVANS. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued search and attack patrols in the vicinity of the firebase.

On 2 September, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from the canopy east of RIFCORD to PHU BAI Combat Base and began preparation for an assault into the TENNESSEE area in reaction to intelligence and contacts developed by ranger teams. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to the 1st Bde.

On 3 September, the battalion moved by CH-47 to LZ ANN and began assaulting into the TENNESSEE area by UH1H. Co D secured the firebase for the insertion of Btry A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty.

The division terminated Operation TEXAS STAR at 1800 hours on 5 September and initiated OPORD 13-70, JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70.

b. Significant Activities. At 0930 hours, 26 August, vicinity YD332239, two kilometers southeast of FS/OB O'REILLY, the CP, and 1st and 3d Companies, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged a large enemy force. Artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes supported the ground elements, which were in contact throughout the day. A search of the contact area revealed 42 NVA KIA. Twenty-six of these were killed by ARA from the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl). Three ARVN soldiers were killed and nine were wounded during the day.

Between the hours of 1935 and 2100 on 28 August, CAMP EAGLE received twelve 122mm rockets, which caused light damage and one minor

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

casualty. PHU BAI Combat Base received three attacks by fire between 0100 and 0618 hours the following morning. Five 122mm rockets, twenty-seven 82mm mortar, and thirty-four 60mm mortar rounds resulted in light damage and seven US personnel with minor wounds.

Later on 29 August, a UH1H from Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, while inserting a ranger team at IC754956, received ground fire and crashed on the landing zone. While the crew and ranger team were securing the aircraft, they received small arms and mortar fire on their position, resulting in four US KIA and four WIA. Trp D and the Aero Rifle Platoon of Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and Co A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf were inserted to reinforce. Artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes supported the contact. A search of the area revealed no enemy casualties.

On 31 August, 28 enemy were killed in the O'REILLY/BARNETT area of operation by elements of the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN) supported by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), and tactical air strikes.

On 3 September, elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force three kilometers south of O'REILLY, killing 24 enemy. ARA and tactical air strikes supported the contact. Six ARVN were KIA and eight were WIA.

During the period 9 August through 5 September, combined operations in the O'REILLY/BARNETT/JEROME area resulted in 614 enemy killed.

5. (C) 5 September - 15 September 1970.

a. On 5 September the division initiated OPORD 13-70, Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 in operational coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and GVN officials within Thua Thien Province to maintain pressure on enemy forces operating in the AO, to deny regular and guerrilla forces access to the lowland population, to deny the enemy access to the rice harvest, and to assist GVN officials in meeting their pacification goals.

Operation TEXAS STAR was costly to the enemy in Northern Military Region I. The division killed 2053 enemy, captured over 600 individual and crew-served weapons and over 200,000 rounds of ammunition of all types, and destroyed or captured over 59 tons of rice.

On 6 September, in support of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON

## CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

PLAN 70, the 1st Bde CP directed extensive repositioning of forces from CAMP EAGLE. Elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf completed refresher training and assaulted to the FS/OB NORMANDY/SPEAR area followed by Btry A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty which moved from FS/OB TENNESSEE. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved from the FS/OB BIRMINGHAM area to PHU BAI Combat Base for refresher training. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf closed FS/OB TENNESSEE and moved to FS/OB BIRMINGHAM, while the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations in the FS/OB BASTOGNE/VEGHEL and area along Route 547.

The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base. The Bde maintained liaison with GVN officials in NAM HOA, PHU THU, HUONG THUY, VINH LOC, PHU LOC, and PHU VANG Districts and provided mobile training teams to advise and assist territorial forces. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf remained at FS/OB BRICK and conducted search and attack patrols in the vicinity. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf and the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued to conduct operations in the piedmont and fringes of the canopy to deny the enemy access to the lowland population. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf secured FS/OB TOMARAWK and FS/OB LOS BANOS and conducted operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf secured FS/OB ARSENAL and conducted operations in the area.

The 3d Bde CP remained at CAMP EVANS and maintained liaison with GVN officials of PHONG DIEN, QUANG DIEN, HUONG TRA and HUONG DIEN Districts and provided mobile training teams to assist in upgrading the combat effectiveness of territorial forces in the Bde AO. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf secured FS/OB JACK and continued operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf remained at CAMP EVANS and conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of FS/OB GLADIATOR. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf provided security for FS/OB RAKKASAN and conducted search and attack operations in the vicinity of FS/OB RAKKASAN/GRANITE.

The 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav continued to conduct ground and armed aerial reconnaissance in the AO and recon zone.

On 7 September, division aviation assets were made available to the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) to assault the 8th Bn, 358th Mar Bde (ARVN) in the western portion of QUANG TRI Province. Two batteries of ARVN 155mm howitzers were moved by air to FS/OB SARGE and HOLCOMB in support of the operation.

On 8 September, the 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl)

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

in support of the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), killed 20 enemy and destroyed one 12.7mm machine gun in the FS/OB O'REILLY area, while elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav began extensive armed aerial reconnaissance of ELEPHANT VALLEY in coordination with the 1st US Marine Division.

On 10 September, in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN), three CH47 aircraft dropped 2,530 gallons of thickened fuel on suspected enemy locations in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. On the following day 2,970 gallons were dropped in the area.

On 12 September, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed refresher training. Company A moved by air to provide security for FS/OR NORMANDY, as Company C moved by vehicle to provide security for FS/OB BIRMINGHAM. The battalion (-) conducted operations in the vicinity of FS/OB NORMANDY/BIRMINGHAM. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved to PHU B-I Combat Base for refresher training and passed to operational control of the 2d Bde.

During this period the enemy concentrated its activities in the vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY/BARNETT/JEROME. Elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) continued conducting operations in the FS/OB O'REILLY area while elements of the 3d Regt (ARVN) continued operation in the BARNETT/JEROME area.

b. Significant Activities. At 061420 September, Btry B, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) supporting the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged and killed two NVA in the vicinity of FS/OB BARNETT.

At 070715 September, the 2d Co, 4th Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on FS/OB BARNETT. Artillery was employed on a suspected enemy location. At 1340 hours, seven rounds of 82mm mortar impacted near the firebase. At 1615 hours, the element received nine rounds of 60mm mortar fire. A suspected enemy location was not determined.

At 070745 September, two kilometers south of FS/OB BARNETT, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered three NVA KIA and one AK-47 resulting from a claymore trap detonation. At 0851 hours, the element received five rounds of 60mm mortar fire on their position, wounding one ARVN soldier. At 1610 hours, the element discovered four bunkers containing four NVA KIA, one AK-47 and six field telephones.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

At 1630 hours, two kilometers southwest of BARNETT, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 21 NVA killed by air strikes one day earlier.

On 8 September, elements of the 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged 15 enemy with organic weapons fire two kilometers northeast of JEROME at 0915 hours. A search revealed three NVA KIA and two AK-47s. At 1050 hours, one kilometer northeast of JEROME, five enemy were engaged with organic weapons fire. A search revealed two NVA KIA and one AK-47. At 1200 hours, two kilometers northwest of JEROME, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 30 huts containing one GR9 radio, 20 82mm mortar rounds, three 122mm rocket fuses, 800 AK-47 rounds, one 50 caliber anti-aircraft machine gun and one 82mm mortar cleaning rod. There was evidence of recent enemy activity.

On 8 September, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire at 1345 hours, two kilometers southwest of FS/OB O'REILLY. At 1500 hours, the elements received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack. ARA was employed. A search of the area revealed 20 NVA killed by ARA, five AK-47s and one RPG launcher. There were two ARVN soldiers KIA and eight WIA.

On 9 September, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf assaulted FS/OB BLITZ, secured the area, and passed to operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf at 0840 hours. Following this assault, Btry C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty moved by air to BLITZ to provide support for operations in the area by the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf.

On 10 September, in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN), three CH-47 aircraft dropped 2,530 gallons of thickened fuel on suspected enemy locations in vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. At 0508 hours, three kilometers southeast of O'REILLY, elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) received 200 82mm mortar rounds which were followed by small arms fire. Organic weapons were employed and the enemy withdrew to the south and east. ARA was employed. A search revealed eight NVA KIA, three AK-47s, 250½ pound blocks of TNT and 50 RPG rounds. One ARVN soldier was KIA and 10 were evacuated for wounds. At 1300 hours, three kilometers south of BARNETT, an element of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search revealed two NVA KIA and one AK-47. Two ARVN soldiers were KIA and one was WIA. At 1500 hours, the element received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire which wounded 10 more ARVN soldiers. A suspected enemy location was not determined.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, Rcs CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

At 102115 September, Ranger Team BUFFALO from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf made contact three and one-half kilometers northwest of FS/OB ROCKET. The 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav provided cover and suppressive fire. Sporadic fire was received until the team was extracted at 1010 hours the following day. An aerial reconnaissance by air was made, but no enemy sightings were reported.

On 11 September, enemy activity continued around FS/OB O'REILLY. At 0208 hours, two kilometers west of O'REILLY, elements of the 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received small arms fire. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. A search conducted under flareship illumination revealed eight NVA KIA, one AK-47, one RPG launcher, 40 RPG rounds, and 120 one pound blocks of TNT. At 1150 hours, two and one-half kilometers southwest of O'REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received small arms fire from an estimated enemy battalion. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. Artillery, tactical air strikes and ARA were employed. A search of the area produced no enemy assessments. Friendly casualties were nine ARVN KIA, 15 ARVN WIA and one Australian advisor KIA.

At 131020 September, three and one-half kilometers south of FS/OB O'REILLY, an element of the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. ARA, Pink Teams (1 OH6A and 1 AH-1 G aircraft) and tactical air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed 30 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one RPG Launcher, miscellaneous documents and 100 3'x6'x3' bunkers destroyed.

At 140235 September, two and one-half kilometers west of BARNETT, an element of the 4th Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon, resulting in 25 NVA KIA. Ten of these were killed by aircraft from A and C Btrys, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl).

At 151905 September, FS/OB BLITZ received 14 82mm mortar rounds resulting in six US KIA, including the CO of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf.

6. (C) 16-30 September 1970.

a. On 16 September, Co C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf assaulted to SLEDGE and secured the area for insertion of Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf which passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn (Ambl),

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

327th Inf. Co A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf assaulted to PISTOL. SLEDGE and PISTOL were secured and prepared for insertion of Btrys B and C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty and Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty the following day. FS/OB BLITZ was closed by Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf which then moved by air to FS/OB SLEDGE and returned to the operational control of its parent battalion.

During the period 16 thru 19 September, the 1st Bde continued operations with three battalions in the BIRMINGHAM, VEGHEL, BASTOGNE, and NORMANDY area with no significant contact.

On 20 September, Co C (-), 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf, under operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, secured and commenced construction of OP CHECKMATE YD6308. Also on 20 September, an aircraft from Co C, 158th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Ambl), received ground fire while in support of a ranger team of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech), and crashed and burned in the vicinity of YD 113725. There were nine US KIA and one US WIA. Four US MIA were from the 101st Abn Div (Ambl).

On 23 September, the 3d Bde repositioned three battalions by air. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by air to the FS/OB GLADIATOR area and commenced operations. The battalion CP remained at FS/OB RAKKASAN. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from the RAKKASAN area to CAMP EVANS to conduct refresher training and assume the mission of division ready force. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf continued to secure FS/OB JACK and conduct operations in the area.

On 25 September, during the air assault of the 5th Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) in the vicinity of XD926546, 14 aircraft from the 158th and 101st Avn Bns (Aslt Hel) (Ambl) received hits and damage from ground fire. Four aircraft were forced to land in field locations and were later extracted. Three crew members from the 158th were wounded and evacuated.

On 26 September, in the 1st Bde area of operations, Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to operational control of 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf and moved by air to open and secure FS/OB TENNESSEE. Division aviation assets repositioned Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty from BRICK to TENNESSEE and a platoon from Btry B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty from PHU BAI Combat Base to BRICK.

On 28 September, the 2d Bn (Ambl) 506th Inf, in operational coordination with the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), assaulted to FB WHIP,

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

secured the FB for their Bn CP, Light CP, 3d Regt (ARVN), Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl) 320th Arty, and Btry B, 14th Arty Bn (ARVN) and commenced operations in the area.

On 29 September, the 2d Bn, 327th Inf moved its CP by air from SLEDGE to FS/OB TOMAHAWK, closing FB SLEDGE.

During this period elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) continued operations in the FS/OB O'REILLY area. The enemy initiated 16 separate indirect fire attacks in the area using 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifle fires. Elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged the enemy 11 times and accounted for 95 NVA KIA.

b. Significant Activities. On 16 September, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav conducted bomb damage assessments and discovered seven NVA KIA and also observed three enemy in the open in the vicinity of YD3027. The enemy were engaged with gunships resulting in three NVA KIA. At 0800 hours, three kilometers southwest of FS/OB O'REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an unknown size enemy force. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. ARA and air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed eight NVA KIA by small arms and 38 NVA KIA by tactical air and ARA.

At 170905 September, in the vicinity of YD312223 aircraft from Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed 10-15 fighting positions and one enemy soldier. The area was engaged with gunships and artillery fires. A visual reconnaissance of the area revealed seven enemy KIA.

On 18 September, four kilometers east of FS/OB JACK YD5124, individuals from Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf detonated four unknown type booby traps with unknown type firing devices resulting in eight US soldiers being evacuated for wounds.

Between 1345 and 1600 hrs on 19 September, 10 CH-47 sorties dropped 9900 gallons of thickened fuel on booby trapped areas at YD5124, resulting in four secondary explosions.

At 190300 September, aircraft from Trp C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav while conducting night armed aerial reconnaissance, observed and engaged 40-45 enemy and numerous bunkers at YD118049, resulting in 18 NVA KIA.

At 201229 September, 500 meters southeast of VIC, Btry A, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl) observed and engaged four

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

enemy and one 12.7mm machine gun position, destroying the machine gun and killing the four NVA. At 1310 hrs, three kilometers west of RIPCORN the Light CP, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Organic weapons, artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed 15 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, 43 RPG rounds and 250 lbs of TNT. ARVN casualties were one KIA and 21 WIA.

At 220403 September, three kilometers northwest of FS/OB RIPCORN the Light CP, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew. A search of the area revealed three NVA KIA, one AK-47, 17 rucksacks, 225  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb blocks of TNT, 21 RPG rounds and 16 60mm mortar rounds. There were two ARVN KIA and two ARVN WIA. At 1135 hrs, in the same area the Light CP of the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received three 75mm recoilless rifle rounds impacting around their position. ARA was employed on a suspected enemy location resulting in one 75mm RR destroyed and one 7.62mm RPD light machine gun destroyed.

On 24 September, the Hac Bao Co passed to operational control of 23 Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. Cavalry aircraft inserted the company three kilometers east of FS/OB BRADLEY and received 50-100 rounds of small arms fire. One UH-1H aircraft sustained two hits resulting in one US WIA. At 1203 hrs, the Hac Bao Co engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic fire. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. The action resulted in three NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun captured, and one ARVN KIA. At 1415 hrs, the company discovered three NVA KIA approximately four days earlier. In the FS/CO O'REILLY area, at 0615 hrs, the 3d Co, 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force three and one-half kilometers south of the firebase. Organic weapons, artillery, tactical air strikes and a flareship were employed. A search of the area revealed 23 NVA KIA, two NVA PW, six AK-47s, three RPG launchers, 15 RPG rounds and 600 one lb blocks of plastic explosive.

At 251527 September, in the vicinity of YC962806 (10 kilometers southwest of AX) the Recon Plt, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received an unknown number of RPG rounds and small arms fire from an estimated platoon 200-400 meters to the north of their position. Organic weapons fire, ARA and tactical air strikes were employed. Two soldiers, US, KIA and five were WIA in the contact. At 1338 hrs, in the vicinity of YC716743 (10 kilometers southeast of THOR) Ranger Tn DALLAS from Company L (BNGR), 75th Inf received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in one US KIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

On 26 September, at 0730 hrs, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav discovered an active 12.7mm machine gun position and engaged the area YD283130 with gunships and a tactical air strike, killing three NVA and destroying the machine gun. At 1043 hrs, elements of Trp A observed and engaged one enemy at YD277138 resulting in one NVA KIA. While conducting bomb damage assessment, elements of Trp A discovered two NVA KIA at YD280134 and one NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed at YD283136.

On 28 September, while conducting visual reconnaissance in the division reconnaissance zone, aircraft from Hq and Hq Trp and Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav made seven separate observations of enemy activity in the vicinity of the RUONG RUONG VALLEY between 0745 and 1135 hrs. The sighted enemy were engaged by gunships, resulting in 17 NVA KIA. Two bomb damage assessments were conducted by elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav in the same area revealing five NVA killed by USAF air strikes. A USAF FAC also reported five NVA killed following two tactical airstrikes against troops in bunkers in the RUONG RUONG Area YC891727.

On 29 September, in operations around FS/OB WHIP, the CP, 2d Bn, (Ambl), 502d Inf and Light CP, 3d Regt (ARVN) received 26 rounds of 60mm mortar on and around the firebase. Artillery was employed on suspected enemy location at YC578869. Results were four US WIA and one ARVN WIA. Also on 29 September, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Ambl), and USAF aircraft killed 14 NVA in the southern portion of the division reconnaissance zone. At 290850 September, three kilometers west of LANG CO BRIDGE (886958), a train on the Hue-DaNang railroad detonated a mine consisting of 40 lbs of TNT with pressure type firing device, resulting in four crossties destroyed and three meters of track damaged.

At 301324 September, while conducting a search and attack patrol, vicinity YC952808, Co B, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned fire and conducted a search of the area. Friendly casualties were one US WIA.

### 7. (C) 1 October - 13 October 1970

a. On 1 October, the 1st Bde continued operating with two bns in the FS/OB BIRMINGHAM/BASTOGNE and VEGHEL/TENNESSEE area while one bn continued offensive operations in the WHIP area in

CONFIDENTIAL



## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

operational coordination with the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bde continued with two bns operating in the piedmont and fringes of the canopy, securing FS/OBs TOMAHAWK, LOS BANOS, ARESENAL, and BRICK, while one bn continued search and attack operations south and southeast of FS/OB PISTOL. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of the 2d Bde from the 3d Bde and assumed the mission of the division ready force. The 3d Bde continued operations with two bns in FS/OB RAKYASAN/GLADIATOR area and one bn in the FS/OB JACK area. The 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav continued operations in the division reconnaissance zone and maintained four teams from Co L (Rngr), 75th Inf in the AO.

On 4 October, operations in the FS/OB WHIP, TENNESSEE and VEGHEL areas were terminated and all three FS/OBs were closed by the 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf. Btrys A and D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty moved by air from WHIP and TENNESSEE, respectively, to CAMP EAGLE. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) and Btry B, 14th Arty Bn (ARVN) moved by air from WHIP to CAMP SALLY. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf terminated Operations in the FB PISTOL area and moved by air to FJU BAI Combat Base for refresher training and assumed the mission of division ready force. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by air from PHU BAI Combat Base to FB BRICK and commenced operations south and southeast of the firebase.

On 6 October, the CP, 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air to OP CHECKMATE. On 7 October, Co's A and B assaulted to YD5611 and YD5711 (northwest of FS/OB BASTOGNE) and Co's C and D assaulted to YD5811 and YD6012. The battalion commenced reconnaissance in force operations in the area in operational coordination with 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN).

Also on 7 October, Btry A, 11th Arty Bn (ARVN) moved by air from FS/OB O'REILLY to FS/OB MANCY. The 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) closed the firebase and moved by air and by vehicle to LA VANG while the 3d and 4th Bns continued patrol operations south and southwest of O'REILLY.

On 13 October, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by vehicle to FS/OB BIRMINGHAM and commenced operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved by vehicle and air from the firebase to PHU BAI Combat Base, and assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training.

b. Significant Activities. At 011250 October, four kilometers north of BASTOGNE, the 3d Plt, Co C, 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf engaged three enemy with organic weapons. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CMFOR-65 (R2) (U)

area revealed one NVA PW. At 012020 hrs, nine kilometers south of AX, the 2d Plt, Co D, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf observed their claymore trap detonate. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one AK-47.

At 020211 October, a UH-1H aircraft from Co A, 326th Med Bn (Ambl), in support of Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, crashed in the vicinity of YC970819 from unknown causes. There were three US killed and one injured in the crash. At 0715 hrs, four kilometers south of FS/OB O'REILLY, the 3d Co, 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated platoon. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew. A search of the area revealed 12 NVA KIA, two AK-47s, one RPG launcher, one RPD light machine gun and 58 half pound blocks of TNT. The contact produced one ARVN KIA and two ARVN WIA.

On 3 October, three ranger teams, assigned the mission of observing enemy traffic in the A SHAU VALLEY, were extracted from the AO. Ranger Team HOUSTON was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YC503887 and was extracted at 031130 October in vicinity YC501887. Ranger Team ANAHEIM was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YC482923 and was extracted at 031130 October from the same area. Ranger Team EGLIN was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YC488899 and was extracted at 031119 October in vicinity YC90898. All three teams reported little or no enemy activity in the area.

On 041947 October, three kilometers southwest of FS/OB TOMAHAWK the 3d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf employed organic weapons fire against an unknown size enemy force, 50 meters to the east of their position. The enemy did not return fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search under flareship illumination revealed three VC KIA, three AK-47s and two rucksacks.

On 5 October, the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed enemy elements in seven different locations throughout the division reconnaissance zone. Gunships and Artillery were employed, resulting in 12 NVA KIA and two mortar tubes captured. At 0910 hrs, one-half kilometer east of RIFLE, YC865988, Co B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf, while conducting search and attack patrols, discovered an enemy cache in an artillery crater. The cache contained the following: nine AK-47s, one Chicom PPS submachine gun - model 43, 16 RPG - 7 rounds, 12 PRG - 2 rounds, 24 RPG booster charges, 1000 rounds of 30 cal ammo, 10 82mm mortar fuses, 38 pull-type fuses for satchel charges, one leather holster, 17 AK-47 magazines, assorted clothing, two 10 pound bags of rice and miscellaneous documents.

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 1970

At 061140 October, two kilometers south of T-BONE, the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), employing organic weapons fire and artillery, engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search of the contact area, revealed 13 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one carbine, 100 khaki uniforms (no markings), 900 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of salt, 10 AK-47 magazines and 50 RPG rounds.

On 7 October, the Recon Plt, 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf observed five enemy four kilometers northwest of PISTOL at 1300 hrs. The enemy were engaged by tactical air strikes. A bomb damage assessment revealed 11 NVA KIA. At 1330 hrs, the same element engaged five enemy with organic weapons four and one-half kilometers northwest of PISTOL. The enemy did not return fire but withdrew in an unknown direction. A search revealed three NVA KIA and one AK-47. At 0704 hrs the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered seven NVA killed by air strikes 24 hrs earlier, three kilometers north of RIPCORN.

At 080800 October, a HOI CHANH led the 26th National Police Field Force, RF Co 144, and PF Plt 22 to a bunker vicinity YD13349. The element employed organic weapons fire against two enemy. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA, one VC PW, three detainees, two M16s, five AK-47s, one M79, one pound of C4, and miscellaneous documents. At 1325 hrs, another HOI CHANH led RF Co 921 to a bunker at YD575401 which contained two AK-47s, one RPG launcher and miscellaneous medical supplies and documents. At 1415 hrs, the HOI CHANH pointed out a second bunker in the same area. RF Co 921 engaged three enemy in the bunker resulting in two VC KIA and one VC PW. At 1540 hrs, the HOI CHANH led the company to a bunker at YD577396 which contained two enemy. The enemy were engaged by small arms fire, resulting in two VC KIA, one AK-47, one 60mm mortar tube, and one .30 cal MG barrel captured. At 1750 hrs, the VC PW attempted to escape and was killed by organic weapons fire from RF Co 921. At 1540 hrs, elements of the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an estimated enemy platoon two kilometers south of FS/OB T-BONE. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search of the area revealed 12 NVA KIA, two AK-47s, one RPG rocket launcher and 480 lbs of rice.

At 091720 October, vicinity of YD198120, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav observed six NVA in green uniforms. The employment of air and gunships resulted in six NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed. At 1350 hrs, elements of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged and unknown size enemy force four and one-half kilometers

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

north of FS/OB BASTOGNE. A search of the area revealed eight NVA KIA and three AK-47s.

At 101239 October, enemy elements engaged the 1st Flt, Co D, 2d Bn (Aml), 506th Inf with RPD machine gun fire four and one-half kilometers north of FS/OB RAKKASAN, resulting in one US KIA. The element was engaged again at 1648 hrs by small arms fire three and one-half kilometers north of the firebase resulting in three US MIA. An AH1G aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav crashed in vicinity YD237400, not as a result of enemy fire, killing one US soldier and injuring another. The aircraft was extracted. Two and one-half kilometers south of T-BONE, reconnaissance elements of the 1st Div (ARVN) discovered a cache containing 16 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon.

At 110900 October, four and one-half kilometers north of BASTOGNE, the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire resulting in seven NVA KIA and three AK-47s. Also on 11 October, Co A, 2d Bn (Aml), 506th Inf detonated a booby trap which wounded two US soldiers in the RAKKASAN area. Two more were wounded by a booby trap in the same area on 12 October, and one US and one Kit Carson Scout were wounded by a third booby trap in the same vicinity on 13 October. CB-47 flame drops were employed in the same area on 11 and 13 October resulting in five and two secondary explosions, respectively.

At 131340 October, four kilometers south of FS/OB DAVIS, ARA in support of elements from the 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon in the open, resulting in six NVA KIA.

8. (C) 14 October - 23 October 1970

a. On 14 October, the 1st Bde CP remained at CAMP EAGLE. The 1st Bn (Aml), 327th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of FS/OB BASTOGNE. The 2d Bn (Aml), 502d Inf with its CP at OP CHECKMATE continued reconnaissance in force operations in operational coordination with the 3d Inf Regt (ARVN). The 3d Bn (Aml), 506th continued search and attack operations in the FS/OB BIRMINGHAM area while the 1st Bn (Aml), 501st Inf remained at PHU BAI Combat Base, continued the mission of division ready force, and conducted Bn refresher training. The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base. The 2d Bn (Aml), 327th Inf continued to secure FS/OBs TOMAHAWK and LOS BANOS and to conduct patrol and ambush operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Aml), 502d Inf continued search and attack operations in the FS/OB ARSENAL area while the 2d Bn (Aml), 501st

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inlosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (R2) (U)

Inf continued operations in the PS/OB BRICK area. The 3d Bde CP remained at and continued to direct operations from CAMP EVANS. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf CP remained at PS/OB JACK and conducted operations in the area. The 1st and 2d Bns (Ambl), 506th Inf maintained their CPs at PS/OB RAKKASAN to direct operations in the RAKKASAN/GLADIATOR area.

The Hac Bao Co, inserted 13 October in response to enemy sightings in the DAVIS area, continued search and attack operations.

On 15 October, the division implemented OPLAN 10-70, Typhoon Tropical Storm Contingency Plan at 1105 hrs, in response to weather reports that Typhoon JOAN would dominate the entire AO causing severe weather conditions for four to five days. The plan called for all US and GVN forces to be resupplied and capable of four day operations without further resupply. Resupply was accomplished by 1730 hrs. All isolated units were repositioned by 1830 hrs, so that reinforcement would be possible should they make contact with a numerically superior force. All aircraft were secured with double tie downs and aircraft flights restricted to combat essential missions. The "USS SCREAMING EAGLE" in Lang Co Bay was cleared of all sensitive equipment. A disaster relief control center was established in the DTOC by the ACoS, G5. Typhoon readiness conditions were terminated on 17 October as weather conditions improved.

On 18 October, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed refresher training. The Bn CP and Recon Plt moved by vehicle to PS/OB BASTOGNE. Co A moved by air to PS/OB BASTOGNE and secured the firebase. Co B moved by air to PS/OB VEGHEL, Co's C and D conducted assaults and began search and attack operations in the BASTOGNE/VEGHEL area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf moved by air and vehicle from BASTOGNE area to CAMP EAGLE, assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training. Elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav inserted Ranger Teams ARGONAUT, FALCONS, VIKINGS and PACKERS in the AO to conduct area reconnaissance and determine the extent of enemy activity. Co L (Rngr), 75th Inf maintained two to four ranger teams in the western AO during the period 18-23 October.

In response to increased friendly casualties caused by booby traps during the period 14-23 October, CH-47 aircraft flew 45 sorties and dropped 22,165 gallons of thickened fuel to clear suspected booby trapped areas. Additionally, two sorties were flown to spray 350 gallons of diesel oil to clear perimeters for Quang Dien District.

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

UH-1H aircraft flew two sorties to spray 160 gallons of retroreflective slurry on enemy infiltration routes.

b. Significant Activities. On 14 October the 3d Plt, Co A, 2d Bn (Aml), 502d Inf was laying concertina wire around OP CHECDMAZE. While driving engineer stakes, the element hit what appeared to be a 105mm dud round. The dud round detonated, wounding four US soldiers. At 1115 hrs, three kilometers east of STELLA, a trooper from the 2d Plt, Co D, 1st Bn (Aml), 501st Inf was wounded when he detonated an unknown type booby trap with a pressure type firing device. Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav killed four NVA in three separate engagements in the central division reconnaissance zone while Ranger Team HUNTINGTON observed, engaged and killed one NVA carrying an AK-47 at ID358173.

At 150820 October, two and one-half kilometers southeast of O'REILLY, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) observed an enemy platoon and employed ARA. A search of the area revealed seven NVA KIA, two M16s, and one RPG launcher.

At 170850 October, in the vicinity of PS/OB JACK, an OH-6A aircraft from the 3d Bde Avn Plt observed one individual with an AK-47 waving a Chieu Hoi leaflet. The individual was picked up and taken to CAMP EVANS. At 1430 hrs, elements of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons fire and artillery to engage an estimated squad three and one-half kilometers south of OP LICM. A search of the area revealed five NVA KIA, two AK-47s and two 6'x8'x4' bunkers destroyed.

On 18 October, the Hoi Chanh picked up the preceding day by the 3d Bde was working with a recon team of Co E, 2d Bn (Aml), 506th Inf three and one-half kilometers north of HELEN when he detonated booby trap consisting of one M26 fragmentation grenade with pressure type firing device, resulting in one Kit Carson Scout wounded in action. The Hoi Chanh stated that he had infiltrated from the north and had only been in the area for three days. He proved to be of little assistance. At 0840 hrs, vicinity YD118093, an OH-6A aircraft from Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav received 100 rds of ground small arms fire, resulting in one hit in the canopy and one hit in the fuel cell. Two US personnel received minor wounds. The aircraft returned to PHU BAI Combat Base and was declared non-flyable.

At 201640 October, a UH-1H aircraft from Co C, 101st Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) (Aml) received machine gun fire while inserting elements

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

of the 1st Inf Div (Ambl) in vicinity of YD3073. One US soldier WIA by shrapnel.

At 210930 October, four kilometers southwest of FS/OB ROY, the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN), employing organic weapons fire, engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy did not return fire but withdrew to the south. A search of the area revealed five VC KIA, three RPG rounds, 100 rounds of 7.62mm ammo, one M60 machine gun and two M26 fragmentation grenades.

On 22 October, enemy activity increased. At 2030 hrs vicinity YD15082, a Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav aircraft observed eight to 10 NVA in the open. The enemy was engaged with gunships. A visual reconnaissance revealed 15 NVA KIA. In the 1st Bde area at 0835 hrs, a bridge YD680092 on Route 547 between BIRMINGHAM and BASTOGNE was discovered to have been sabotaged by demolitions. At 1855 and 2023 hrs, FS/OB BIRMINGHAM received a total of 25 unknown type mortar rounds which impacted outside the perimeter. At 1935 hrs, at YD670090, Co D, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received 30 unknown type mortar rds. In the 2d Bde area at 1900 and 2030 hrs, FS/OB ARSENAL received two mortar attacks totaling eight 82mm rds which impacted 500 meters outside the perimeter. There were no casualties or damage. In the 3d Bde area at 0330 hrs, CAMP EVANS received 25 rds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding one US soldier. At 1350 hrs, at YD496243, a trooper from the 3d Plt, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap killing one US soldier and wounding another. At 1845 hrs, CAMP EAGLE received two 122mm rockets which impacted outside the bunker line.

At 230800 October, one kilometer southwest of HELEN, the 3d Plt, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, employing organic weapons fire, engaged five enemy. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the south. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA and one AK-47. At 1145 hrs, vicinity YD424082, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav aircraft received 50-100 rds of small arms fire. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in three NVA KIA. At 2315 hrs, Trp C aircraft observed seven NVA in the open at YD711098. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in four NVA KIA.

9. (C) 24 October - 31 October 1970

a. On 24 October impending typhoon conditions (Typhoon KATE) caused the division to again implement OPLAN 10-70. Typhoon Tropical Storm Contingency Plan. Based on weather reports, the division moved into

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Typhoon Condition 1 at 1500 hrs. All aircraft were secured and a disaster relief control center was established in the DTCC. In the 1st Bde area the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf completed refresher training on 23 October and moved by air to the FS/OB VEGHEL and OP CHECKMATE area. The battalion commenced search and attack operations in the VEGHEL/BLAZE/CHECKMATE area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air and vehicle to CAMP EAGLE on 23 October, assumed the mission of division ready force and commenced battalion refresher training on 24 October.

TYPHOON KATE moved over the coast of Military Region 1 south of DA NANG on the morning of 25 October, causing heavy rains and winds up to 50 knots throughout the division AO. TYPHOON KATE rapidly dissipated on 26 October, but persisting low cloud ceilings and scattered rain showers precluded complete utilization of division aircraft assets.

On 26 October, the 1st Bde CP remained at CAMP EAGLE and maintained liaison with the 3d Regt (ARVN). The 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf continued operations in the FS/OB BASTOGNE area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations vicinity of FS/OB VEGHEL, while the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the FS/OB BIRMINGHAM area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued the mission of division ready force and conducted refresher training at CAMP EAGLE. The 2d Bde CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with the 54th Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations in the FS/OB TOMAHAWK/LOS BANOS area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf continued operations south and southeast of FS/OB BRICK while the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued operations in the FS/OB ARSENAL area. The 3d Bde CP remained at CAMP EVANS and maintained liaison with the 1st Regt (ARVN). The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf continued operations in the FS/OB JACK area, with elements north and northwest of MEXICO. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the FS/OB RAKKASAN area while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued search and attack, and patrol and ambush operations in the piedmont, vicinity CAMP EVANS.

On 27 October, a northeastern cold front moved into the division area bringing persisting low cloud ceilings and rain which severely restricted use of division aircraft. This cold front, typical of the transition from the southwest to the northeast monsoon, influenced weather in the division area of operations through 31 October. Heavy rains resulted in floods throughout the populated lowlands of northern Military Region 1.

On 30 October, the division Disaster Relief Control Center became operational in the DTCC and commenced coordination with US and GVN officials to provide support for flood victims in the populated lowlands. Division aircraft assets were provided to XXIV Corps to evacuate flood victims in

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Inclosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSPOF-65 (R2) (U)

the DA NANG area. On 31 October, division aircraft evacuated 534 flood victims and distributed 54 tons of C-Rations in support of civil affairs operations in the DA NANG area. Disaster relief operations continued in the division area through the end of the reporting period.

b. Significant Activities. On 24 October, aircraft from Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav killed seven NVA in four separate engagements in the vicinity of FS/OB BEGHEL. At 1300 hrs, four and one-half kilometers north of FS/OB BASTOGNE, a trooper from Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap with an unknown type firing device located on a trail, resulting in one US soldier WIA. At 1720 hrs, three and one-half kilometers south of FS/OB JACK, a trooper from Co C, 3d Bn (Ambl), 157th Inf was wounded when he detonated a Soviet mine with a pressure type firing device. At 1440 hrs, two and one-half kilometers west of O'REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) employing organic weapons fire, engaged an unknown size enemy force. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the area revealed two NVA KIA, one AK-47, one M79, eight graves containing eight NVA killed by tactical air strikes approximately two weeks earlier, three huts containing eight AK-47 rifles, one unknown type machine gun and two RPG launchers. At 1600 hrs, the element received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on and around their position. One US advisor and three ARVN soldiers received minor wounds. At 2223 hrs, PHU BAI Combat Base received 14 rds of 82mm mortar fire which impacted throughout the compound. There were two US personnel WIA.


On 251030 October, elements of Co D, 326th Engr Bn (Ambl) and Co A, 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf were returning to FS/OB RAKKASAN after conducting road clearing operations when a three-quarter ton truck detonated an estimated 15 lbs of TNT at YD490221. The team had cleared the road at the point of detonation approximately one hour prior to the incident. There was one US soldier KIA and 8 were WIA.

On 28 October, an ambush in the vicinity of C Sector, CAMP EAGLE (YD802178), received small arms fire and an unknown number of RPG rds from an estimated enemy squad. The ambush element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. Six US soldiers were wounded.

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Inclosure 2 (Fire Support/Operational Bases) to Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR -65(R2) (U)






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Inclosure 4 (Area of Operation) to Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR -65

(R) (U)

SKETCH: Division AO at the beginning of JEFFERSON GLS / MORRISON PLAN TO



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